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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Oversight of Recognized Organizations: Understanding
Flag States Practices.

Degree:

Master of Science

Delegation of statutory tasks by flag States’ maritime administrations to Recognized
Organizations (ROs) has become a common practice in the shipping industry.
Accordingly, the capacity of these flag States administrations to oversee their
Recognized Organizations for ensuring that they fulfil the delegated tasks is critical to
provide safety in shipping.
This study seeks to understand how flag States perform their oversight duties. It
analyses flag States’ practices to provide good and/or best practices that can be shared
among flag States.
It briefly examines the history of delegation to and oversight of ROs. Then, it provides
international conventions and theoretical background that frame the relations of power
between flag States and their ROs.
Through in-depth interviews and document analysis, this dissertation uses the
instrumental case study of USCG practices to highlight significant changes that
occurred in the ROs’ oversight framework since the El Faro accident in 2015. This
case study provides ground for subsequent quantitative analysis to detect good and/or
best practices to monitor ROs activities.
The study found that oversight activities should be a systematic and adequatelyresourced programme set up around a dedicated personnel or coordination office that
supports highly qualified flag State personnel and maintains effective communication
with its ROs. Based on the findings, the study proposes an analogy between a ship and
ROs’ oversight practices through a graphic representation of the guiding principles for
oversight programme best practices.

KEYWORDS: Recognized Organizations, Oversight, Flag States’ Obligations, Flag
States’ Practices, Good Practices, Recognized Organizations Code, Recognized
Organizations oversight by the USCG.

iii

Table of Contents
Declaration .................................................................................................................. i
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... ii
Abstract...................................................................................................................... iii
List of Tables .............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 5
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

Background and Context ................................................................................. 5
Problem Statement and Justification of the Research .................................. 6
Research Aim, Objectives and Questions....................................................... 8
Structure of the Dissertation ........................................................................... 8

Chapter 2: Literature review .................................................................................. 10
2.1.
Concept of flag State in International Shipping .......................................... 10
2.1.1.
Rights and Duties of Flag States .................................................................. 11
2.1.2.
Limitations of Flag State Concept and Proposed Alternatives .................... 12
2.2.
ROs in the Flag State Concept ...................................................................... 14
2.2.1.
From Classification Societies to ROs .......................................................... 14
2.2.2.
Private and Public Functions of Classification Societies/ROs ..................... 15
2.3.
Theoretical Background on Oversight Power Relationship among
Organizations: the Principal-Agent Theory .................................................................. 16
2.4.
Flag State and ROs as Principal-Agent ........................................................ 18
2.4.1.
International Legal Framework .................................................................... 18
2.4.2.
Duties of Flag States to oversee RO ............................................................ 20

Chapter 3: Methodology and methods................................................................... 23
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
3.5.
3.6.
3.7.
3.8.
3.9.

Methodology ................................................................................................... 23
Research design .............................................................................................. 23
The American Flag State Case Study ........................................................... 25
Research Methods .......................................................................................... 27
Data Collection, Processing and Analysis .................................................... 29
Pilot test ........................................................................................................... 31
Selection of Participants ................................................................................ 31
Transparency, Reliability, and Biases .......................................................... 32
Research Ethics .............................................................................................. 33

Chapter 4: Findings ................................................................................................. 34
4.1.
4.2.
4.2.1.
4.2.2.
4.3.
4.3.1.
4.3.2.
4.4.
4.4.1.
4.4.2.
4.5.
4.5.1.

Introduction to the USCG oversight framework of ROs ............................ 34
Organizational Structure ............................................................................... 37
Findings of the Qualitative Method ............................................................. 37
Findings of the Quantitative Method ........................................................... 40
Flag state personnel ........................................................................................ 41
Findings of the Qualitative Method ............................................................. 41
Findings of the Quantitative Method ........................................................... 43
Oversight Activities: Planning, and Implementation .................................. 44
Findings of the Qualitative Method ............................................................. 44
Findings of the Quantitative Method ........................................................... 49
Evaluation and improvement of oversight programmes ............................ 53
Findings of the Qualitative Method ............................................................. 53

iv

4.5.2.
Findings of the Quantitative Method ........................................................... 55
4.6.
Impact of Global Disruption and Relevance of Joint Programme, and
International Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB) .......................................... 56
4.6.1.
Global Disruption: The Case of COVID-19 ................................................ 56
4.6.2.
Combined Oversight Programmes ............................................................... 58
4.6.3.
International Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB) ......................... 59

Chapter 5 Discussion ............................................................................................... 62
Chapter 6 Conclusions............................................................................................. 71
References ................................................................................................................. 75
Appendix ................................................................................................................... 85
Appendix A: List of Countries and their ROs (extracted from GISIS database) ...... 85
Appendix B: List of main documents used for the USCG case study ......................... 87
Appendix C: Example of Concepts Suggested by the Software Atlas.ti ..................... 91
Appendix D: Question Guide for In-depth Interviews ................................................. 92
Appendix E: Questions of Semi-structured interviews ................................................ 95
Appendix F: Interviewee Details .................................................................................... 97
Appendix G: Survey questionnaire ................................................................................ 98
Appendix H: WMU Research Ethics Committee Approval ...................................... 105
Appendix I: Details about the Participants in the Survey.......................................... 106
Appendix J: Delegation Status of ROs authorized by the USCG .............................. 107
Appendix K: Flow Diagram for Quality Case Applicability...................................... 108
Appendix L: Main Changes in the USCG oversight framework after the El Faro
accident 109

v

List of Tables
Table 1. Statutory Services Delivered by ROs on Behalf of the USCG from 20192021. .................................................................................................................. 36
Table 2. Evaluation of the importance to set up a dedicated oversight service in the
Flag State administration ................................................................................... 41
Table 3. Evaluation of the Requirements for the Flag State Personnel in Charge of
Oversight Activities ........................................................................................... 44
Table 4. Evaluation of the Activities for Oversight of ROs. ..................................... 49
Table 5. Evaluation of the Practices related to the Planning of ROs Oversight
Activities by the Flag State. ............................................................................... 51
Table 6. Evaluation of the Practices related to the Implementation of ROs Oversight
Activities by the Flag State. ............................................................................... 52
Table 7. Evaluation of the Practices related to Evaluation and Improvement of ROs
Oversight Programme. ....................................................................................... 56
Table 8. Evaluation of the Impact of COVID-19, and the Relevance of combined
Oversight Programme and IQARB .................................................................... 60

1

List of Figure
Figure 1. Research Design. ....................................................................................... 25
Figure 2. Structural Organization of ROs Oversight by the USCG. ......................... 37
Figure 3. Significance of the Oversight Organizational Structure. ........................... 40
Figure 4. Most Important Requirements for the Flag State Personnel in Charge of
Oversight Activities. .......................................................................................... 44
Figure 5. Best Activities for Oversight of ROs......................................................... 49
Figure 6. Best Practices for Successful Planning of ROs Oversight Activities by the
Flag State. .......................................................................................................... 50
Figure 7. Best Practices for Successful Implementation of ROs Oversight Activities
by the Flag State. ............................................................................................... 52
Figure 8. Best Practices for Successful Evaluation and Improvement of ROs
Oversight Programme. ....................................................................................... 56
Figure 9. Impact of COVID-19 on Oversight of ROs by the Flag State. ................. 58
Figure 10. Relevance of combined oversight Programme for Enhancing ROs'
oversight by the Flag State................................................................................. 59
Figure 11. Relevance of IQARB for Enhancing ROs Oversight by the Flag States. 60
Figure 12. Representation of the guiding principles for oversight programme best
practices. ............................................................................................................ 69

2

List of Abbreviations
RO: Recognized Organization
IMO: International Maritime Organization
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
U.S.: United States
USCG: United States Coast Guard
NASEM: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
LDC: Least Developed Countries
SIDS: Small Island Developing States
UNCLOS
GISIS: Global Integrated Shipping Information System
IACS: International Association of Classification Societies
SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
TONNAGE: International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships
MARPOL: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
LLC: International Convention on Load Lines
AFS: International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on
Ships
MLC: Maritime Labour Convention
RO Code: Code for Recognized Organizations
WMU: World Maritime University
U.S.A: United States of America
TSMS: Towing Safety Management System
MSP: Maritime Security Program
ACP: Alternative Compliance Programme
CFR: United States Code of Federal Regulations
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board
CVC-4: Flag State Control Division
MSC: Marine Safety Center

3

OCMI: Officer in charge of Marine Inspections
TPOC: Third Party Organization Coordinator
VCA: Vertical Contract Audit
INT 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6: Interviewee 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
MISLE: Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement
ISM Code: International Safety Management Code
ACB: Accredited Certification Body
DOC: Document of Compliance
COC: Certificate of Compliance
ISSC: International Ship Security Certificate
SMC: Safety Management Certificate
MMS: Mission Management System
IMSAS: IMO Member State Audit Scheme
KPI: Key Performance Indicators
COVID-19: Corona Virus Disease 2019
MOC: Memorandum of Cooperation
EMSA: European Maritime Safety Agency
IQARB: International Quality Assessment Review Body
EU: European Union

4

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. Background and Context
A Recognized Organization (RO) is an organization assessed, found compliant with
the RO Code, and authorized by a flag State to execute, on its behalf, statutory
certification and services according to the flag State’s international and national
obligations (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 2013; IMO, 2011).
Delegation of statutory tasks by flag States’ maritime administrations to ROs has
become a common practice in the shipping industry (Mansell, 2009). Accordingly, the
capacity of these flag States administrations to oversee their ROs for ensuring that they
fulfil the delegated tasks is critical to provide safety in shipping.
However, the analysis of the IMO consolidated audit summary reports from 2016 to
2019 shows that items related to the oversight of ROs represent the majority of the
shortcomings in the area of delegation of authority by flag States to their ROs (IMO,
2021). Causing more than 40% of the findings or observations1 related to the area of
delegation of authority (IMO, 2021), the oversight of ROs may be considered the
Achilles' heel in the relation between flag States and their ROs. This need to effectively
evaluate and oversee ROs is shared by maritime administrations particularly those with
limited resources (Mansell, 2009).
The review of available academic works shows that several studies have been done on
the liability and responsibility of ROs and classifications societies but few address
power relations between ROs and flag States (De Bruyne, 2019; De Bruyne &
Vanleenhove, 2016; Jacobsson, 2014).

1

In the IMO Consolidated Audit Summary Report, there are seven sub-area under the area of
“delegation of authority.” The findings and observations related to the sub-areas dealing with flag
states’ oversight responsibilities represented more than 40% of the shortcoming under the area of
“delegation of authority.”
(https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/MSAS/Documents/MSAS/Analysis/III%207INF.27%20%20Analysis%20of%20four%20consolidated%20audit%20summary%20reports%20under%20the%2
0IMO%20Member%20State%20Audit%20Schem...%20(Secretariat).pdf)
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For example, Basedow & Wurmnest (2006) explored the third-party liability of the
German classification societies. Through a comparative study of some selected
traditional maritime countries such as the United States and France, they examined the
claims that third parties can initiate legal complaints against the German classification
society based on countries’ private laws. The same issue of third-party liability has
also been studied by Karaman (2011) by comparing Turkish, Swiss, German and
American laws.
Using the database of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of Tokyo and the
MoU of Paris, together with data supplied by the International Association of
Classification Societies, Silos et al. (2013) revealed the need for better oversight of
ROs to reduce substandard ships. Xiao and al. (2020) supported the same idea that
monitoring indicators such as ships’ age, history, and RO is essential to identifying
and eliminating substandard ships. However, academic research addressing the issue
of flag States’ practices to evaluate and oversee ROs is missing.
Regarding RO´s link with flag States, the RO code sets the framework to help flag
States in the assessment and authorization of classification societies before delegating
some of their functions to ROs (IMO, 2013a). Despite this framework, statistics of
MoU agreements such as the Paris MoU shows that the RO-related detentions rate
remains an issue for the performance of flag states (Paris MoU, 2020). Hence, the
question of oversight to ensure the performance of ROs is paramount not only for flag
States but also for regional and international bodies like IMO in charge of regulating
shipping activities.

1.2. Problem Statement and Justification of the Research
In 1983, the U.S.-flagged (United States of America-flagged) cargo ship Marine
Electric sank off the coast of Virginia causing the death of 31 crewmembers. The
investigation report underlined failures of the United States Coast Guard (USCG)
oversight programme of ROs. In the recommendations about the ROs oversight, the
accident investigation team proposed to stop the delegation of statutory functions to
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private entities and allow only USCG inspectors to verify compliance of U.S.-flagged
commercial vessels with the safety standards. However, the USCG refused to end its
third-party delegation programmes but decided to enhance the oversight programme
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine [NASEM], 2021;
USCG, 1985).
In 2015, another U.S-flagged cargo ship, the El Faro, sailing from Florida to Puerto
Rico sank during a hurricane off the coast of the Bahama Islands. Even though the
main reason for the accident was linked to unsafe actions and decisions made by the
ship’s master and owner before and during the voyage, the investigation board
highlighted also failures in the RO oversight programme as significant contributing
factors. Despite the reforms implemented three decades earlier, the investigation
concluded of resemblance between the concerns raised in the two accidents (NASEM,
2021; National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], (2017); USCG, 2017)
The El Faro accident causing the death of 33 crewmembers, including 28 Americans
transformed the question of ROs oversight into a national hot topic. Consequently, the
United States Congress enacted a public law, the Save Our Seas Act of 2018, which
incorporated the section Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of 2018 to address the issue
of ROs oversight. The new law ordered several changes to the organization and
training of the USCG personnel as well as the evaluation and oversight of ROs (Save
Our Seas Act, 2018).
This situation reveals that the issue of RO oversight is not just a challenge for Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).2 Moreover,
it poses the question of understanding the current changes and innovations set by the
American flag States administration to improve the oversight of its ROs. Most
important, it queries what the maritime industry can learn from this instrumental case.

2

According to the United Nations there are 46 Least Developed Countries and 38 Small Island
Developing States. Their lists are available respectively at the following links:
https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/list and https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids
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1.3. Research Aim, Objectives and Questions
This research explores the question of oversight of RO’s performance to help countries
and international organizations in their role of providing safety in the shipping
industry. It aims to propose good or best practices that can be used to oversee ROs in
their capacities of fulfilling their responsibilities on behalf of flag states. Further, this
research explores how flag states can efficiently use their maritime administration´s
limited resources to properly supervise the services provided by their ROs.
To achieve the aim and objectives discussed in the previous section, this dissertation
will address the following questions:
 How do flag States oversee their ROs?
 What can be shared as good or best practices to oversee ROs activities?

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 “Introduction” provides the
background to situate the issue of ROs oversight in the wider context of flag States
obligations. Then, it uses historical cases to pose the problem of flag States' practices
in providing appropriate oversight of their ROs. After posing the problem which
justifies the research, this chapter clarifies the aim and objectives to achieve and states
the questions guiding the research.
Chapter 2 “Literature review” focuses on the theoretical and historical background
necessary to understand and discuss the issue of oversight of ROs by flag State
administrations. It introduces the concept of flag States by discussing the rights and
duties of flag States before highlighting the limitations and alternatives to the current
concept.
Chapter 3 “Methodology and methods” displays the detailed process used by the
researcher to answer the research questions and achieve the aim presented in chapter
1. This gives the reasons why the researcher used a qualitative methodology built on a
case study approach and a quantitative survey. It also describes the data collection and
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analysis process. Moreover, it presents the selection criteria of the participants and
considers the question of transparency, reliability, biases and ethics related to the
research.
Chapter 4 “Findings” highlights the main results of the researcher's investigations.
Based on the conceptual framework provided in part 3 of the RO code3, the chapter
organizes and reports the key findings by considering the following aspects of ROs
oversight: flag States’ organizational structure, flag States personnel requirements, and
planning, implementation, evaluation, and improvement of oversight programmes.
Chapter 5 “Discussion” synthesizes and provides interpretations of the main findings
presented in the previous chapter. It also evaluates patterns as well as ambiguities in
light of the research questions and the conceptual framework guiding the research.
Additionally, it presents the limitations that need to be considered when assessing the
final results of this research.
Chapter 6 “Conclusions” summarizes the result of the research and deduce applicable
knowledge through recommendations.

3

Part 3 of the RO code is one of the main IMO instruments that lays down the guiding principles of
ROs oversight by flag State administrations. More details are provided in the section 2.4.1.
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Chapter 2: Literature review
2.1.

Concept of flag State in International Shipping

Since the times of the ancient Greeks, cities, armies and states have used flags as a
symbol of identity and ownership. Also, the development of the state-nations concept
after the Peace of Westphalia enabled the emergence of more structured international
law based on the notion of sovereignty. Since that period, the notion of sovereignty
has remained at the centre of international law and relations among states (Mukherjee
& Browning, 2013). Consequently, flags became also signs of sovereignty
highlighting States’ rights and duties as codified in the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States (1933). For ships, flags became an external manifestation
of their nationality entitling them to benefits from the military, diplomatic and legal
protection as well as economic privileges given by the flag State. According to,
international maritime law a state gives its flag to a ship through the registration
process and a ship can sail under the flag of only one state (United Nations Convention
of the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], 1982).
Mansell (2009) highlights that the classic concept of Statehood is not always
applicable to international shipping and maritime law. First, even though flag States
and States claim sovereignty, they do not have the same status with regard to
international law. Not all flag States satisfy the definition of a State as accepted in
international laws per the criteria of population, territory, government and capacity to
engage with other States. For example, Dependent Territory Registries that are not
nation-States and cannot enter into a treaty with other States can become flag States
by establishing their registry. Second, the flag State's prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction are more reduced than that of a State. States prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction is extended to five principles: national, territorial, protective, universal,
and passive personality principles. In contrast, flag States’ criminal jurisdiction and
enforcement powers are limited to two principles: nationality and territoriality.
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For Mukherjee & Browning (2013), the notion of ship nationality is critical to
overcoming challenges posed by the functional characteristic of mobility of ships
operating beyond the jurisdictional limits of a state. They explained that as a selfcontained unit providing a place for social and professional interactions, ships need a
legal regime at any time to frame these interactions. Therefore, flag States’ laws
establish the legal framework under which ships can operate to prevent any legal void,
particularly on the high seas. A ship without nationality is considered a criminal ship
which cannot benefit from the protection of any flag State (Klein, 2011).
Consequently, ships cannot trade internationally if a flag State does not grant her its
nationality (Watt & Coles, 2009).

2.1.1.

Rights and Duties of Flag States

The fundamental right of flag States is their privilege to fix conditions under which
they grant their nationality to a ship. This is done through the administrative process
of registration. The classical law case stating the right for a state to unilaterally
determine the prerequisite for granting its nationality to a ship is the Muscat Dhows
Case (1905). In this case, opposing France and Great Britain, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, stated: “Generally speaking it belongs to every
Sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe
the rules governing such grants.” This principle will later be codified in international
law through Article 91 of the UNCLOS. Even though article 91 of UNCLOS requires
the existence of a “genuine link between the State and the ship,” practice shows that
the notion of a genuine link remains elusive (Xhelilaj et al 2017; Yu et al., 2018).
The lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the notion of “genuine link” explains
the diversification of the registration system into closed registries and open registries
such as secondary, international and hybrid registries. These variations are based on
the level of control over registered ships. For example, a closed registry which is the
traditional mode of registration in the shipping industry will require a close
operational, technical, economic or social connection between ships and flag States.
To be specific a closed registry may have registration criteria such as ships manned by
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flag States citizens, ships built in flag States shipyards, or ships owned by flag State’s
natural-born citizens and companies established under the flag States laws. To escape
these restrictions, shipowners from traditional maritime countries flagged out to
registries less stringent and more functionally and economically attractive. This reality
favoured the shift from the traditional view of the registration process as an assertion
of flag State sovereignty over its ship to a view of ship registration as a service-oriented
activity with more competition (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013).
Regardless of the system of registration adopted, all flag States have obligations to
fulfil the same duties according to international law. Flag States' primary duties are
stated in the UNCLOS also described as the “constitution of the sea” (Barnes &
Barrett, 2016). Article 94 of this convention states four areas of responsibility for flag
States. First, paragraph 1 of this article requires each state to “effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag.” In paragraph 2, a flag State needs to maintain a registry of ships flying its flag
and exercise jurisdiction over these ships, their masters, officers and crews. Paragraph
3 and 4 provides that each flag State shall take action and set out specific details for
ships in its registry to ensure safety at sea. Paragraph 7 obliges a flag State to conduct
investigations when ships flying its flag are involved in a marine casualty. All these
duties shall be conducted according to “generally accepted international regulations.”
In other words, flag States have the primary responsibility to implement and enforce
maritime international regulations for ensuring compliance of their vessels with
international standards.

2.1.2.

Limitations of Flag State Concept and Proposed Alternatives

Despite sovereign rights on its ships, a flag State may not take enforcement actions
against its ship in another State’s waters because those actions could encroach on
another’s sovereignty. This limitation derives from the principle of territoriality. The
territoriality principle provides that states have legislative and enforcement
jurisdiction over activities occurring in their territories. Therefore, a flag State may
share jurisdiction with coastal and port States when ships flying its flag is operating
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within another state's waters. Under these circumstances, ships are subject to
concurrent jurisdictions (Honniball, 2016; Jiancuo & Pengfei, 2021; McDorman,
1997).
Also, the ambiguity around the notion of “genuine link” leading to a diversification of
registry systems has increased the issue of effective control and oversight of ships by
flag States. This situation was highlighted with the surge of the flag of convenience
phenomenon after 1920 due to the Prohibition4 in the United States (Carlisle, 1981;
Currie, 1963; Özçayir, 2001). Even if the practice of flag-in and flag-out for specific
reasons is as old as the shipping industry, it has reached a significant proportion in the
last century sparking the issue of the flag of convenience which has changed the
structure of shipping worldwide. The transformation of ship registration into a more
service-oriented activity allowed non-traditional maritime countries—with less
control and enforcement power over their fleets—to become major flag States. The
lack of effective control from major flag States to ensure compliance with international
standards led to numerous accidents impacting maritime safety and environment
(Hamad, 2016).
Because of the limitation of the flag states concept and its impact on maritime safety
and environment, several scholars questioned the relevance of the flag state system in
the shipping industry. For example, Kovats (2006) and Behnam (2003) explained that
ships should be designated as subjects of international law and would operate directly
under regulations done by the international community. Consequently, ships will no
more be subject to legislative involvement of flag States but under the control and
enforcement power of international organizations.
However, Karim (2010) explained that for practical reasons this “revolutionary
approach” could be difficult to implement. He rather supported the solutions proposed
by Molenar (2007) of enhancing and tightening the power control of port States as
4

The Prohibition Era began in 1920 with the vote of the 18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
banning the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating liquors. Because of this measure
many American flagged vessels flag out to the Panamanian registry.
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well as the solution of Mooradian (2002) of broadening the prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction of coastal States to the Economic Exclusive Zone.
One of the solutions adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was
to enhance flag States' control and enforcement capabilities by allowing them to
delegate some of their statutory tasks to Recognized Organizations (ROs) (Silos et al.,
2013). As stated by Mansell (2009), the majority of IMO member states request the
service of ROs for controlling their fleet. Therefore, the issue for flag States is how to
develop an effective oversight program to ensure that ROs are fulfilling the delegated
tasks as required.

2.2.

ROs in the Flag State Concept

2.2.1.

From Classification Societies to ROs

Classification societies evolved out of the need for shipowners to show evidence of
the suitability of their ships for shipping activity to insurers and charterers. The first
society was Lloyd’s. It was named after the London coffee house where people
involved in the shipping (merchants, marine underwriters) used to gather from the
seventeenth century. From a meeting point, it became a new place to get information
because the owner began printing a news sheet called Lloyds News with information
on parliament proceedings, foreign war news, executions, and marine news. But the
business had a new orientation after his death in 1713. The same year, his relatives
founded Lloyd’s List which focused on shipping news through a network of
correspondents around the world (Lloyd’s Agent). They created a Register Society in
1760 and a register of ships was published in 1764 to inform merchants and
underwriters about the conditions of ships. The ratings given by Classification
Societies became a significant tool for underwriters. In 1834, it merges with the
shipowner’s register to become the Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping.
This new registry published rules for the survey and classification of ships leading to
the birth of Classification societies (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 2022; Lloyd's Register,
2022, Mansell, 2009).
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For independence purposes, the earliest clients of the Classification society were
underwriters doing payments by subscribing to registers. However, this model
changed when Lloyd’s Register initiated charges for surveys and purchasing of
Register Books to shipowners. The survey was a process of evaluating the condition
of ships and giving them a “rate” symbolizing the seaworthiness of the ship. It was an
evaluation of risk to judge the constructional quality and the maintenance state of the
hull and the rigging and determine navigational categories— a safe area of operation
at the sea for the ship. However, shipowners’ desire for more than just surveys of
construction and occasional ratings was answered by the creation of a classification
certificate to prove the ongoing standard of the vessel through a system of regular
surveys (Boisson, 1994). This was the creation of the “Class rules” system which later
became significant in the regulatory framework for design and construction purposes.
Meanwhile, national laws evolved to allow flag states for carrying out statutory
surveys to check the condition of the ship and its equipment for navigational and safety
purposes. Class rules surveys of hull and machinery were gradually adopted by flag
states as proof of compliance with standards by ships to avoid duplications of surveys.
Also, flag States increasingly delegated their statutory powers to classification
societies that had more personnel with the required expertise to execute the complex
activity of ship surveys. For example, in 1890, the British administration delegated the
authority to assign freeboards to Lloyds and Bureau Veritas. That delegation of
authority may be considered as the earlier hours of Classification societies acting as
ROs (Mansell, 2009). According to the IMO Global Integrated Shipping Information
System (GISIS) database (2022), there are 104 ROs.

2.2.2.

Private and Public Functions of Classification Societies/ROs

A RO is an organization that has been assessed by a flag State, found compliant with
the RO code, and authorized by this flag State to perform statutory certification and
services as per IMO mandatory instruments and the flag State’s national legislation
(IMO, 2013a; IMO, 2011).
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According to Mansell (2009), these ROs can be categorized into two groups. The
eleven members5 of the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS)
with long-standing expertise, uniform standards and procedure, consultative status at
the IMO, and more than 90% of the world cargo tonnage may be classified as
“Conventional” ROs. Other ROs, sharing the tonnage not covered by IACS members,
could be considered “Convenient ROs.” From this classification, it appears that most
of the RO’s works are done by entities that are classification societies, particularly
IACS members. Therefore, it raises a conflict of interest between the private function
done as classification societies and the public service fulfilled as ROs (Jessen, 2014).
The conflict of interest is because the same entity, with his hat of classification society,
is employed by shipowners to provide surveys and certificates of seaworthiness and
good condition of a ship for mainly insurance purposes. These are called “class”
surveys and certificates. Meanwhile, as a RO, the same entity is employed by flag
States to survey, inspect, and ensure that the same ship is complying with flag State
standards by delivering “statutory” surveys and certificates. Classification
Societies/RO are paid by shipowners for consultative services. On the other hand, they
are tasked by flag States but also paid by the shipowner to deliver public services
(Hosanee, 2008). This conflict of interest highlights the necessity to understand the
power relationship between flag States’ administration and ROs, particularly the need
for an oversight programme to ensure that the latter is fulfilling the tasks as delegated
by the former.

2.3. Theoretical Background on Oversight Power Relationship among
Organizations: the Principal-Agent Theory
The principal-agent theory originates from the disciplines of economics and
institutional study field with the revolutionary approach of the Nobel laureate Ronald
Coase. He introduced the notion of “social cost” in the 1960s to explore how property
5

Because of the sanctions imposed on Russia following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February
2022, the IACS Council withdrew the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping’s (RMRS) membership
of IACS on March 11, 2022 (https://rs-class.org/en/news/general/international-association-ofclassification-societies-has-taken-an-illegitimate-decision-to-withdraw/).
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rights and transaction costs affect business and society. His studies considered the
relation and power balance between parties engaged in a bargaining process outside of
litigation processes (Noble prize organization, 2022; Brewer et al. 2010). As noted by
Bernhold & Wiesweg (2021), the primary aim of the principal-agent theory is to devise
a contractual relationship between principals and agents as flawless as possible. For
this reason, the principal-agent theory is considered one of the dominant approaches
to studying the relation of power—delegation and oversight—between principal and
agent in several domains such as international relations (Schillemans & Bjurstrøm
2020; Pollack, 2006).
In the principal-agent theory, the principal represents someone, an organization or an
institution who delegates power. The agent represents someone, an organization or an
institution to whom the authority is delegated. Therefore, the principal is the one who
oversees the agent for ensuring that the power delegated is adequately used and tasks
delegated are properly fulfilled. Principal aims at ensuring that the agent's action
adheres to the principal’s goals because the responsibilities remain with the principal
(Moloi & Marwala, 2020; Lupia, 2001; Moe, 1984).
Brewer et al. (2010) highlighted that the convergence of principals’ objectives and
agents’ decisions may be jeopardized by four major factors. The first one is what he
called the “adverse selection” problem. This occurs when principals do not have a
good knowledge of the agents’ values and abilities. As a consequence, principals can
delegate to an agent who is not the best choice for achieving the principal’s objective.
Second, the “diverse objective programme” problem happens when agents’ objectives
are at the expense of the principals’ objectives. This situation requires expensive
monitoring and controlling of the agents. Third, the unequal distribution of information
between agents and principals results in the “information asymmetry” problem. The
final problem is the “weak incentives problem” where principals lack enough decision
power and capacity to ensure the commitment of the agent to the principals’ values
and expectations.
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Several researchers criticized the principal-agent theory for failing to predict the
conditions and reasons under which principals delegate and oversee agents; however,
most have not brought forward flexible frameworks and alternatives (CuevasRodríguez et al., 2012; Hendry, 2005; Lan & Heracleous, 2010; Lubatkin et al., 2007).
Also, new approaches such as the stewardship-agency theory (Majone, 2001; Davis et
al., 2018) should not be seen as opposed to principal-agent theory, but rather as the
same approach evolving on a double continuum. The first continuum represents how
much an agent is committed to its principal objectives. This continuum moves from
an agent with more focus on its self-interest to an agent or trustee with more focus on
the principal interest. The second continuum considers how much a principal entrusts
its agent. This continuum moves from a principal who delegates more power with less
oversight role to a principal who retains more power with more oversight functions
(Pollack, 2006). Consequently, the principal-agent theory is considered an empirically
valid theory to provide insightful analysis of delegation and oversight systems when
dealing with a problem involving cooperative structure (Eisenhardt, 1989).

2.4.

Flag State and ROs as Principal-Agent

2.4.1.

International Legal Framework

Under relevant IMO’s and International Labor Organization’s mandatory instruments,
flag States are required to control their ships to ensure compliance with international
regulations. For example, regulation I/6 of the 1974 International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), article 7 of the 1969 International Convention on
Tonnage Measurement of Ships (TONNAGE), Annex I regulation 6, Annex II
regulation 8, Annex IV regulation 4, and Annex VI regulation 5 of the 1973/1978
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
article 13 of the 1966/1988 International Convention on Load Lines (LLC), Annex 4
regulation 1 of the 2001 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Antifouling Systems on Ships (AFS) and regulation 5 of the 2006 International Maritime
Labour Convention require that officers of flag state administrations inspect and
survey their ships as part of the flag States responsibilities for ensuring safety,
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environmental protection and adequate working conditions. However, flag states may
delegate some of these tasks to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to Recognized
Organizations. Despite that delegation, flag States still retain full responsibility under
the existing conventions (IMO, 2019a). Accordingly, flag States are principals
delegating tasks to ROs acting as their agents. As same as in the principal-agent theory,
flag States assume the oversight role of ROs because they remain responsible for the
actions of the ROs acting on their behalf.
To assist flag States in the delegation process and to ensure consistent global
implementation of international requirements, IMO adopted the Code for Recognized
Organizations (RO Code) in 2013 by resolutions MEPC.237(65) and MSC.349(92), to
replace resolutions A.739(18) on Guidelines for the authorization of organizations
acting on behalf of the Administration and resolution A.789(19) on specifications of
the survey and certification functions of RO acting on behalf of the Administration.
The RO Code establishes minimum criteria against which organizations are assessed,
recognized and authorized to carry out delegated tasks. Also, it defines guidelines for
the oversight of these organizations by flag States. This code is divided into 3 parts.
The first part addresses the general provisions of the Code by defining the purpose,
the scope, the principle of delegation and oversight, and the content of the Code. One
specific feature of the oversight principle is that flag States should cooperate to make
sure that their common ROs are discharging their delegated tasks under the Code.
Part 2 of the Code is related to the recognition and authorization requirements. This
part identifies the mandatory prerequisites that an organization shall satisfy to be
recognized by a flag State as an RO. Additionally, it presents the mandatory
requirements with regard to independence, impartiality, integrity, competence,
responsibility and quality management policy. These requirements need to be fulfilled
by any RO performing statutory certification and services on behalf of its authorizing
flag States. Also, part 2 of the Code provides the mandatory requirements that flag
States shall follow when assessing, recognizing, authorizing and delegating statutory
tasks to an RO.

19

Part 3 deals with the oversight of ROs by the delegating flag States. In this part, there
is guidance to develop and implement an oversight programme for ROs performing
statutory certification and services on behalf of a flag State.
To sum up, the RO code provides mandatory minimum criteria for the selection and
delegation of tasks to ROs. However, it only suggests non-mandatory guidelines to
flag States for fulfilling their oversight role over the ROs. Consequently, it raises the
question of flag States' practices in their oversight role of delegated ROs.

2.4.2.

Duties of Flag States to oversee RO

The legal obligation for a flag State to oversee its ROs derives from that flag State's
ultimate responsibility to ensure that ships flying its flag are complying with the State’s
international and national obligations as stated in article 94 of UNCLOS. This
oversight responsibility is also restated in IMO conventions and codes such as SOLAS,
MARPOL, MLC, Load Line Conventions, and IMO Instruments Implementation
Code. For example, SOLAS regulation I/6 mentioned, “In every case, the
administration shall fully guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the inspection
and survey, and shall undertake the necessary arrangements to satisfy this obligation.”
Consequently, each flag State administration must retain the resources and capability
to verify and monitor the work of the RO as well as conduct its own flag State
inspections of vessels flying its flag when necessary (Mansell, 2009).
According to the RO Code (2013), oversight is any supervision activity implemented
by a flag State to confirm that ROs actions satisfy the IMO and national requirements
of the delegating State. In other words, oversight allows a flag State to ensure the
convergence of its objectives and the action taken by its ROs. It assures the flag State
that its national and international responsibilities are properly fulfilled and its
reputation safeguarded.
Part 3 of the RO code lays down a proposal framework that addresses the
establishment, management, monitoring, revision and improvement of an oversight
programme. This framework considers the objectives, extent, responsibilities,
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resources, procedures, implementation, records of an oversight programme as well as
the evaluation of RO’s performance by flag States. The code also defines keywords
related to oversight activities and elaborates on the principles of audits to facilitate a
common interpretation of the oversight framework. For example, it allows flag States
to rely on audits performed by accredited certification bodies. Beyond the framework,
it encourages intergovernmental cooperation among flag States that have
authorizations with the same ROs for conducting joint or combined monitoring
activities.
Even though the oversight of ROs remains a significant issue for the shipping industry,
as highlighted by the IMO consolidated audit summary reports from 2016 to 20196,
few academic peer-reviewed articles address that issue.
For example, N'Hoboutoun (2018) used the study case of the Togolese flag to analyse
the effect of the delegation of authority on the performance of the country’s fleet. He
concludes that the inadequate oversight of the ROs, particularly the non-ICAS member
was one of the main reasons for the poor performance of the Togolese fleet.
Also, Park (2012) analysed IMO’s consolidated audits summary and deduced that
there is a need to improve the oversight of the ROs by flag States. Hence, he proposed
an oversight scheme on a performance basis for better targeting of poor-performing
ROs.
In 2017, Olsen studied how the power relation between a flag State and its ROs can
affect safety onboard ships. He categorized these relationships into three groups:
compliance-based approach, rational data-driven approach, and dialogue-based
approach. After analysis, he recommended a mix of three approaches as the best
solution to improve safety in the shipping industry.
However, the question of how flag States practically oversee their ROs for fulfilling
their obligations remains unexplored. Exploring the ways and means developed by
6

See section 1.1 for more details.
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flag States to oversee the performance of their ROs will enable the identification of
good practices for improving safety in the shipping industry. The next chapter will
present the methodology and methods undertaken by the researcher to answer the
questions of flag States' practices and identify good and best practices.
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Chapter 3: Methodology and methods
3.1.

Methodology

This research adopts a qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research is
characterized by a naturalistic, and interpretative approach to exploring phenomena
from the interior by taking the perspective and description of the research participant
as a starting point (Aspers & Corte, 2019; Flick,2009). This methodological approach
suits this topic which aims to provide a deep understanding of flag States’ practices in
the oversight of their ROs. Achieving that aim cannot have a better starting point than
considering the perspective of the person involved daily in the implementation process
of flag States’ oversight programs.
Also, as highlighted by Ritchie et al. (2104), qualitative research methodology is
suitable when the research purpose is to answer questions “what, how and why” rather
than “how many”. Moreover, the complexity of the topic and the potential nuances
among flag States’ understanding of their responsibilities support the choice of this
methodological approach which provides flexibility in the research process for an indepth exploration and understanding of the issues involved. Therefore, choosing a
qualitative research methodology provides a range of theoretical frameworks with an
adequate selection of methods, instruments, and procedures for the researcher to
investigate, analyse and answer the research questions. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).

3.2.

Research design

The research is designed into two main steps consisting of an instrumental case study
providing ground for a subsequent quantitative approach to respond to the research
questions. The choice of the case study approach answers the challenges posed by the
scope and time limit of a Master of Science program. The scope and time limit of this
research could not allow an in-depth investigation of all the flag States with ROs
oversight responsibilities. According to the online IMO’s database, there are 146 flag
States administrations which delegate their statutory tasks to ROs (see Appendix A).
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This means that there are 146 potential administrations to be studied. Hence, the
researcher adopts the instrumental case study approach allowing the choice of a
specific country to answer the first research question about explaining flag States’
practices to oversee the performance of their ROs. The conceptual framework
provided in part 3 of the RO code guided the exploration of that case study.
Also, the instrumental case study approach is appropriate to address the research
question because it is designed to play a supportive role in understanding complex
issues. An instrumental case study allows the researcher to focus more on the issue at
stake than on the case itself (Stake, 1995). This approach is convenient for the research
because the issue of the oversight of ROs is beyond a single country case, as explained
in section 1.2. Consequently, the adoption of this approach will enable the researcher
to remain focused on the RO oversight issue.
However, the choice of case study method comes with the inherent challenges of that
qualitative research approach, namely how to overcome the problem of case selection
with the danger of selection bias and how to find criteria for generalization beyond the
immediate case (Benett, 2004).
To overcome the first challenge, the researcher adopts a purposive non-probability
sampling method. This sampling method is the most suited for answering the first
research question because it mitigates the risk of selection bias and provides the
opportunity for an in-depth investigation of specific topics (Etikan, 2016). Details on
the choice of the case study will be further discussed in the following section.
Also, the researcher’s choice of a quantitative approach to supplement the case study
aims at addressing the second challenge of generalization beyond the chosen case.
Benett (2004) recommends a multi-method approach between case study and
quantitative method to make the best possible use of their complementarity. Hence,
the exploration of the case study provides adequate insight for identifying critical
dimensions that enables the development of a quantitative questionnaire to address the
second research question.
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The statistical analysis of the answers to the questionnaire will provide results which
will be discussed and assessed by subject matter experts in order to provide
conclusions and recommendations. The research design is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Research Design.
Source: Author.

Note: A Mixed-method Approach consisting of a Case Study with a Quantitative
Survey. Numbers represent the sequential progress of the research.

3.3.

The American Flag State Case Study

The researcher chose the United States of America (U.S.A) as an instrumental case
study because it presents unique features that will provide significant insight into the
issue of ROs’ oversight by flag States administrations. First, the U.S.A recorded
accidents where the failure in the oversight of ROs was directly highlighted as a
significant contributing factor to the accident. For example, in 1983, the U.S.-flagged
cargo ship Marine Electric sank off the coast of Virginia causing the death of 33
crewmembers. The investigation report highlighted failures of the USCG oversight
programme of ROs. Concerning the inspection of U.S.-flagged commercial vessels,
the accident investigation team recommended stopping the delegation of statutory
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functions to private entities and allowing only USCG inspectors to verify compliance
of these ships with the safety standards. The USCG refused to end their third-party
delegation programmes but decided to enhance the oversight of its third parties. In
2015, another U.S-flagged cargo ship, the El Faro, sank off the coast of the Bahamas
Island during a hurricane. Despite the reforms implemented three decades earlier, the
investigation of the El Faro also pinpointed failures in the RO oversight programme
and conclude of similitude between the concerns raised in the two accidents (NASEM,
2021; USCG, 1985; USCG, 2017).
Second, the casualties of the El Faro accident, 33 crewmembers including 28
Americans, brought the issue of ROs oversight to the forefront of the American
national debate. To illustrate, in the aftermath of the accident, the United States
Congress passed into public law the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of 2018. This
law addressed the issue of ROs oversight specifically. It ordered several changes in
the USCG oversight organization and training as well as the USCG practices to
evaluate and oversee ROs performance (Save Our Seas Act, 2018).
Third, choosing the American example gives the possibility to investigate several
types of oversight programmes because the USCG is maintaining different types of
delegation and oversight regimes within its fleet. For example, the Streamlined
Inspection Programme (SIP) designed for unmanned barges involved in domestic
navigation, the Towing Safety Management System designed for towing vessels
(TSMS), the profiled programme for vessels enrolled in the Maritime Security
Program (MSP), and the Alternative Compliance Programme (ACP) for ocean-going
cargo ships involved in foreign trade (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and medicine, 2021). Hence, the American case provides the opportunity to look at the
issue of ROs oversight from different perspectives.
This dissertation does not seek to appraise the effectiveness of the RO’s oversight
programme developed by the United States because such a task will require classified
data that is beyond the reach of the researcher. The USCG case rather serves as a
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practical example providing insight to facilitate the understanding of the flag State
practices.

3.4.

Research Methods

The design of the research suggests a pragmatic mixed method approach not only to
allow an appropriate gathering of the data needed to answer the research questions but
also to provide different perspectives on the issue of ROs oversight by flag States
administrations (see steps 1 and 3a of Figure 1). For the first research question, a
document analysis of national regulations and in-depth interviews were conducted to
investigate the case study and provide necessary data for a better understanding of the
flag States’ practices (see step 2 of Figure 1).
The document analysis focused on the United States laws, regulations, circulars,
reports, procedures, forms, and job aids related to delegation to and oversight of their
ROs (see Appendix B for the list of documents). Qualitative content analysis is a
systematic method allowing to reduce the amount of data and focusing on those
relevant to the research question (Rosengren, 1981). The qualitative analysis of the
regulatory documents constituted an essential source of information about how the flag
State maritime administration understands, organizes and fulfils its oversight role of
ROs. The initial knowledge provided by the qualitative content analysis of relevant
documents provided a discussion basis for subsequent in-depth interviews.
In-depth interviews are qualitative data gathering methods involving individual
interviews with a reduced number of persons, generally subject matter experts, to
explore their perspectives and experience on a particular topic. This method is also
appropriate to provide context and detail about other data collected (Boyce & Neale,
2006). Thus, this method was suitable to learn about how oversight regulations are
implemented. Moreover, the researcher was able to get an insight into the challenges
encountered during the implementation phase. In addition to enabling a deep
understanding of the issue at stake, the document analysis and in-depth interviews
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conducted to answer the first question lay the ground to develop a quantitative survey
for the second question (see step 3b of Figure 1).
The second research question was addressed through a quantitative method. The
researcher carried out a quantitative survey to collect the views of participants on what
are the best practices to develop and implement successful oversight programmes of
ROs by flag States administrations. The researcher formulated the questions of this
survey based on not only the conceptual framework of part 3 of the RO code but also
the findings from the case study conducted to answer the first research question (see
steps 3a and 3b of Figure 1). The questionnaire consisted of closed and open-ended
questions. For the close-ended questions, the researcher used a Likert scale, with the
grading system “not important” for 1 point, “slightly important” for 2 points,
“moderately important” for 3 points, “very important” for 4 points, and “extremely
important” for 5 points, served as quantification method to provide a numerical value
to the choice of participants (see steps 4 and 5 of Figure 1). The statistical analysis of
this quantitative survey questionnaire provided ground for generalization of the final
result of the study deriving from the study case (Benett, 2004).
To discuss and assess the result of the analysis from the survey, the researcher
conducted semi-structured interviews with subject experts matters (see step 6 of Figure
1). Semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to guide the discussion and
remain focused on core topics. At the same time, it gave freedom to discuss emerging
and relevant topics through follow-up questions (Harvey-Jordan & Long, 2001).
Consequently, this method offers the researcher the possibility to assess the statistical
results for their practical interpretation.
To conclude, the researcher considered the main findings from the case study, the
survey results and the semi-structured interviews with experts for interpretation,
discussion, and synthesis purposes (see steps 7a, 7b, and 7c of Figure 1).
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3.5.

Data Collection, Processing and Analysis

National regulation and in-depth interviews constituted the main source of data for the
qualitative content analysis to answer the first research question. Relevant national
rules framing the oversight programme of flag States' maritime administrations were
retrieved from the internet and received from the person interviewed. The researcher
used the framework provided in part 3 of the RO code to generate the necessary code
for the analysis of these documents and the interview transcripts. The codes generated
were: “organization and structure”, “personnel and training”, “planning and
implementation”, and “evaluation and improvement”. However, the researcher
remained open to new codes that could emerge from the direct analysis of the
document at hand. The coding was done with the Qualitative Data Analysis Software
ATLAS.ti 7 (see Appendix C). ATLAS.ti is a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data
Analysis Software (CAQDAS) suited for studying connectedness among several
documents (Barry, 1998). Also, Paulus & Lester (2016) noted that despite some
limitations such as lack of real-time collaboration and online interactional data,
ATLAS.ti allowed a transparent, rigorous, reflexive, and systematic analysis of
qualitative data. Hence, it helps the researcher to work with a large amount of data and
support deep analysis of information gathered.
Recording software on phones or laptops was used to collect data from the face-toface and online interviews conducted during the research. Most of the online
interviews were conducted through video meeting software such as Zoom 8 and
Microsoft Teams.9 Interviews were done in French and English. French interviews
were translated into English by the researcher for harmonization during the coding
process. The researcher also took notes during the interviews. This facilitated the
organization of the data and the generation of follow-up questions, particularly during
the in-depth interviews. Moreover, taking notes helped maintain a record of unspoken

7 Details

on the software are available at the link https:// https://atlasti.com/
Details on the software are available at the link: https://zoom.us/
9 Details on the software are available at the link: https://www.microsoft.com/en/microsoft-teams/group-chatsoftware
8
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details enabling better analysis of collected data. Transcription and coding of the
records were manually done by the researcher. Even though it was time-consuming,
the choice of manual transcription provided further insight that fostered the analysis
process.
The quantitative survey was conceived and distributed via the internet using the online
survey software QuestionPro.10 The World Maritime University (WMU) offered free
access to its students to benefit from this paid online software. QuestionPro permitted
the creation and distribution of questionnaires as well as collecting and synthesizing
data through graphs and tables. In addition to the statistical analysis available with
QuestionPro, the researcher extracted the survey data and used the Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences SPSS11for deeper analysis. This analytical tool has already been
used for research in the maritime industry (Bailey et al., 2006; Christodoulou et al.,
2019; Thai, 2008).
The researcher designed the survey to collect two sets of quantitative data. The first
set12 illustrated the significance of defined items related to oversight activities. The
analysis of the USCG instrumental case study and the analysis of the RO code part 3
framework provided the relevant items to generate the survey questions (see steps 3b
and 3a of Figure 1). These items are related to the organizational structure and
personnel of flag States’ administration, the planning, implementation, evaluation and
improvement of ROs’ oversight programmes. The sum of the grading, according to
the Likert scale defined in section 3.5, gave an evaluation of how important responders
valued each of the proposed items. The second set13 of quantitative data considered
the same items, but the objective was to choose the three most important. By
comparing these two sets of data, the researcher was able to get insight into the

10

Details on the software are available at the link: https://www.questionpro.com/
Details on the software are available at the link: https://www.ibm.com/se-en/analytics/spssstatistics-software?mhsrc=ibmsearch_a&mhq=spss.
12
The first set of data is made of answers to questions 1.1; 2.1 to 2.7; 3.1 to 3.5; 4.1 to 4.7; 5.1 to 5.4;
6.1 to 6.6; and 7.1 to 7.3 of the survey questionnaires (appendix F)
13
The second set of data is made of answers to question questions 2.8; 3.6; 4.8; 5.5; and 6.7 of the
survey questionnaires (appendix F).
11
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preference of the responders about good and/or best practices related to ROs oversight
programmes.

3.6.

Pilot test

The researcher conducted pilot tests before applying his final research instruments.
For example, after developing the initial question guide for in-depth and semistructured interviews, the researcher sent the pilot questionnaire to six students and
alumni of the World Maritime University from different countries. Three of them had
in-depth knowledge of the topic because of their background in Maritime
Administration or ROs personnel. The other three had no expertise in the topic before
their study at the World Maritime University allowing new perspectives to address the
question of RO oversight. The comments from these different perspectives were used
to amend and enrich the final question guides. The same process was conducted to
develop the final questionnaire for the quantitative survey.

3.7.

Selection of Participants

The technicality of the topic required participants with thorough experience in the
issue under study to provide useful, excellent, and reliable data (Morse, 2010). To
select participants with the potential required to discuss the topic, the researcher
employed the purposive-convenience sampling method. Consequently, the pool of
potential participants includes three categories of people with a background as
practitioners— Maritime Administrations, ROs and consultancy agency personnel.
The researcher conducted six interviews consisting of 3 in-depth interviews and 3
semi-structured interviews respectively with INT 1, INT 2, INT 3, INT 4, INT 5, and
INT 6 (see Appendix D, E, and F).
The researcher got the contact of the interviewees from fellow students, professors at
the WMU, and lecturers met during his class field trips. Getting access to these
resourceful personnel was sometimes a slow and difficult process because of their busy
schedule. However, they were all comfortable and enthusiastic to discuss the subject
and share their experience.
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For the participant in the survey, in addition to the network used for contacting the
interviewees, the researcher also shared the link to the survey questionnaire on the
WMU alumni online platform to reach a maximum of people. The targeted personnel
were people from the maritime sector (Maritime Administration, ROs, and
consultancy agencies) with expertise related to the oversight of ROs. 97 participants
responded to the survey questionnaire (see Appendix G and H for the details on the
survey and the participants in the survey).

3.8.

Transparency, Reliability, and Biases

Transparency in the research process is essential for building credibility and
trustworthiness (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). To demonstrate transparency, the
researcher systematically documented and described thoroughly all actions undertaken
during the research—development of the data collection instrument, selection of
participants, data collection, processing and analysis of the data.
Also, the researcher constantly triangulated the data by considering multiple sources
to enhance trustworthiness (Yin, 2014). For example, to mitigate the influence of
participant bias, the researcher not only looked for diverse perspectives and
backgrounds but also compared and contrasted the information received from the
interviewees with available literature. When data were not concordant the researcher
undertook further investigation or request more clarification from the interviewees.
Findings were critically assessed and all possible explanations were considered before
conclusions. By fostering trustworthiness, credibility, and transparency, the researcher
maintained a chain of evidence to improve the research's internal reliability (Yin,
2014)
Furthermore, the researcher applied a timestamp test to validate the questionnaires that
he received. He did not validate survey questionnaires that were completed in less than
5mn because the average completion time during the pilot test was 14 minutes 29
seconds with a minimum completion time of 10 minutes 47 seconds. Therefore, the
researcher considered that a responder could not read and answer properly the
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questions in less than 5 minutes. After application of that filter, 7 questions to the
surveys were found invalid.
In addition to the time test, the researcher also considered answers provided by
responders. For example, some questions were linked to detect responders who
randomly answered the questions. This test allowed the removal of 6 questionnaires.
Finally, 84 answers to the surveys were judged valid for the study.
Qualitative studies are influenced by researchers’ biases, backgrounds and beliefs
(Merriam, 2002). Concerning the researcher's background, it should be mentioned that
the researcher has no previous experience with RO-related issues. Hence, he has not
built strong biases before undertaking this research. However, the researcher
acknowledged that his preferred ontological and epistemological approach informed
and influenced how he collected and interpreted data. In other words, the natural way
of thinking of the researcher affected his choice during the research process. Thus, to
keep these inherent biases under control, the researcher maintained a research diary to
facilitate reflexivity throughout the research process (Nadin, 2006).

3.9.

Research Ethics

Ethical considerations were critical for the researcher. All instruments used during
this research were approved by the WMU Research Ethics Committee before
proceeding with the data collection.
The researcher gave particular attention to ensuring the well-being of the participants
throughout the data collection process. Participants received information explaining
the objectives of the research and the details of how their data will be processed. Each
participant gave his informed consent. Also, participants were informed of the
possibility to revoke their participation at any time without any conditions.
Moreover, several measures were taken to protect the identity of the participants. Data
were stored on a hard drive protected by a password and processed with
confidentiality.
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Chapter 4: Findings
This chapter will present the main findings from the qualitative and quantitative
methods undertaken by the researcher. First, it presents the main features necessary to
understand the USCG oversight framework to monitor ROs. Then, it displays the result
of the case study and the survey by considering the following aspects: organizational
structure, requirements for flag state personnel in charge of oversight activities,
planning and implementation of oversight activities, as well as evaluation and
improvement of ROs oversight by flag States administration.

4.1.

Introduction to the USCG oversight framework of ROs

As explained by the interviewees, the lead governmental agency in charge of
implementing and enforcing most of the IMO’s instruments in the U.S.A is the Coast
Guard. This agency is under the Department of Homeland Security. Confusion should
not be made with the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) which is an agency
under the Department of Transportation. The U.S MARAD mission is to technically
support the maritime transportation infrastructure of the U.S.A and promote the use of
waterborne transportation by providing a seamless integration of maritime
infrastructure with other transportation systems. Its objective is to ensure the viability
of the U.S. merchant marine (U.S Department of Transportation Maritime
Administration, 2022). However, according to section 2 of the USCG Act (1946), the
USCG's primary responsibilities are to ensure the safety of life at sea, and to enforce
or assist in the enforcement of all applicable federal laws, on, under, and over the high
seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.SA. Consequently, the
administration in charge of the oversight of ROs is the USCG.
American regulations, particularly subpart 2.45 of title 46 of the U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), define a RO as an organization authorized by the USCG to carry
out statutory certifications and services on behalf of the U.S.A (Shipping Act, 2012).
Part 8 of title 46 of the CFR provides more details about the criteria requested to be
accepted as a RO in the U.S.A. Among the criteria, it is required that the RO:
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 Has functioned as a classification society for at least 30 years and developed
its own class rules;
 Has adequate geographical coverage and resources to carry out all delegated
functions;
 Has a total classed tonnage of at least 10 million gross tons;
 Has a minimum of 150 exclusive surveyors;
 Has a permanent corporate office in the United States;
 Maintains an internal quality system not less than the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 series certification;
 Maintains and ensures compliance with a Code of Ethics recognizing inherent
responsibilities associated with delegation of authority;
 Provide a U.S. supplement14 to the class rules.
This definition incorporates the RO’s definition provided in the IMO instruments,
particularly the RO code. As an example, it is stated in subpart 2.45 of title 46 of the
U.S. CFR that a classification society seeking approval to become a RO in the U.S.A
must comply with the minimum standards as recommended in IMO resolution
A.739(18). Authorization to act as an RO in the U.S.A is granted on a reciprocal basis.
A classification society whose headquarter is not in the U.S.A can be recognized as a
RO only if the country where this classification society has its headquarter accepts the
American classification society—American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)—as a RO.
The USCG has authorized 07 ROs to act on its behalf. There are the American Bureau
of Shipping (ABS), Bureau Veritas (BV), Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK), DNV GL,
Indian Register of Shipping (IRS), Lloyd's Register (LR), and RINA. They are all
IACS members (see appendix I for the delegation status of each RO). In the Domestic
Annual Report on the Flag States Control, the USCG reports data displaying the

14

A U.S. supplement is a document prepared by the classification society and approved by the USCG.
This document addresses areas where USCG requirements are not incorporated in the Classification
Society rules or in international convention. A supplement aims to ensure that ROs knows and will
apply U.S regulations during its delegated tasks (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-1224/pdf/97-33477.pdf).
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number of vessels and companies inspected by ROs (Table 1). These data show a
continuous increase in the service delivered by ROs on behalf of the USCG.
Consequently, the USCG needs to adapt its oversight plan to monitor properly the
services delivered by the ROs on its behalf.
Table 1. Statutory Services Delivered by ROs on Behalf of the USCG from 2019-2021.

Years

Number of
vessels in the
U.S Fleet
subjected to
inspection

Number of vessels
attended by ROs for
statutory surveys

Number of vessels
attended by ROs
for Safety
Management
Certificate audits

2019
2020
2021

20,064
19,398
18,967

3,479
4,377
4,436

856
965
1031

Number of ship
management
companies attended
by ROs for
Documents of
Compliance audits
174
185
185

Note: Numbers extracted from the USCG Flag State Control Annual Report 2019, 2020, and
2021. Even though the first report was published in 2017, it is in 2019 that the data about
the number of vessels and companies attended by ROs to deliver statutory services began to
be published.

The need to review USCG oversight practices became apparent with the accident of
El Faro in 2015. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Coast Guard
Marine Board of Investigation report revealed several shortcomings in the USCG
oversight practices that facilitate the occurrence of this accident. The findings from the
investigations which are relevant to the oversight functions of the USCG can be
grouped into the following observations: inappropriate organizational structure and
lack of clear policies to oversee RO performance, shortcomings in the RO surveyors
and Coast Guard marine inspectors’ competencies and qualifications to verify vessels
compliance, and inadequate data tools and metrics to facilitate vessel compliance
verification. The significance of the El Faro case prompted American lawmakers to
adopt the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of 2018 and compelled the USCG to
update its RO oversight practices and organizational structure.
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4.2.

Organizational Structure

4.2.1.

Findings of the Qualitative Method

The structure of the USCG administration for ensuring oversight of ROs is built on the
Flag State Control Division (CVC-4), Marine Safety Center (MSC), Traveling
Inspection Staff, and Coast Guard Sectors (Figure 2). The CVC-4 was created
following the recommendations of the El Faro investigation teams. This division,
working under the Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance (CVC), is responsible
for overseeing ROs and other third-party organizations acting on behalf of the USCG.
His primary responsibility is to issue policies, and procedures to guide USCG marine
inspectors in conducting oversight examinations of ROs works. It represents the
contact point for ROs’ management staff at the USCG headquarters.
Figure 2. Structural Organization of ROs Oversight by the USCG.
Source: Author.

The Marine Safety Center is an independent Headquarter Command in charge of
approval and review of plans for the design, construction, repair and alteration of U.S.
flag vessels. It provides technical oversight of the classification societies and ROs for
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the USCG. It is considered the technical point of contact of the ROs at the USCG
headquarters level.
The Traveling Inspection Staff is a group of specialized and highly qualified senior
marine inspectors. Working under the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy,
it provides support to field inspection teams through consultancy on a range of issues
such as regulatory compliance. It serves as an on-call, travelling technical resource to
assist with vessel operations considered high risk, unique, or of special interest.
At the sector level, the USCG Sector Commander is responsible for all Coast Guard
missions within his area of responsibility. He cumulates the functions of Captain of
the Port, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, Search and Rescue Mission
Coordinator, maritime Federal On-Scene Coordinator, and Officer in Charge of
Marine Inspections (OCMI). As the OCMI, he is entitled to inspection, enforcement,
and administrative powers to implement title 46 and title 33 of the U.S. Code about
maritime safety, security and environment protection within the U.S. waters.
Consequently, he commands the USCG workforce in charge of marine inspections at
the field level and represents the highest authority in charge of ROs oversight in his
area of responsibility.
At the field level, the oversight of ROs is the responsibility of the Third-Party
Organization Coordinator (TPOC). This function was created after the El faro
accident. The TPOC is a subject-matter expert for oversight of third parties such as
ROs that fulfil delegated functions on behalf of the USCG. He leads inspection teams
during complex inspections and Vertical Contract Audits (VCA)15 and conducts trend
analyses and quality reviews of Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement
(MISLE) data. 16 The new function of TPOC aims at facilitating the coordination
According to the RO code part 2, a “VCA is a contract/order specific audit of production processes,
including witnessing work during attendance at a survey, audit or plan approval in progress and, as
applicable, including relevant sub-processes. A VCA is carried out at a location or a site (Survey
Station/Approval Office/Site) to verify the correct application of relevant requirements in service
realization for the specific work in that contract/order, and their interactions.”
16
MISLE is a USCG data gathering system that tracks law enforcement, environmental protection,
marine security and safety activities of U.S. commercial and recreational vessels, their owners and
15
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between the USCG field inspectors and the headquarter as well as between ROs and
USCG by coordinating all USCG oversight activities with the ROs personnel at the
field level.
The changes in the American organizational structure after the El Faro accident show
that an emphasis is placed on the coordination aspect between ROs and USCG. For
example, Coast Guard policies required each Coast Guard unit to have an officer
serving as a liaison with each RO. This liaison officer is the main point of contact for
the RO surveyors and Coast Guard inspectors within each local region. The El Faro
accident investigation reveals that most of the Coast Guard units did not have such a
liaison officer. Following the recommendations of the investigation team, the USCG
created 19 positions of Third-Party Organization Coordinators to engage and provide
support to their safety partners such as ROs (NASEM, 2021). Also, the creation of the
Flag State Control Division at the USCG headquarters answers to the need to
coordinate oversight activities of ROs at the national level. With the primary task of
providing policy, procedures, and guidance to RO, the Flag State Control Division
monitors and assesses ROs’ activities to maintain a performing American fleet.
Even though interviewees acknowledge that countries might set up different structural
organizations to oversee ROs, they agree that a good oversight structural organization
should consider both field-level and office-level oversight. The field level oversight
relies on the flag States’ inspectors and auditors to have a look at the quality of the
product which is the vessel with its safety procedures. The office level relies on liaising
with ROs management personnel to provide continuous support and facilitate the
resolution of problems. As claimed by INT 3,
It seems there could be many ways to organize a maritime administration to
optimize its RO oversight role. Some combination of field-level flag state
inspectors or surveyors that are able to observe at first-hand the vessels’

shipping companies
(https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_uscg_misle.pdf).
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conditions, along with office personnel that liaise and correspond with the RO
personnel, would seem important.

4.2.2.

Findings of the Quantitative Method

The mean and mode of “setting a dedicated oversight service within the flag State
administration” to oversee ROs are respectively 3.86 and 4 (Table 2). This means that
the average grade given by the responders is 3.86 and the most frequent grade
appearing in the response is 4. These two values compared to the grading system of
the Likert scale defined in section 3.5 showed that most of the responders considered
a “dedicated service” to be “very important” for a successful oversight framework.
The second set of data related to the structural organization of flag States
administrations confirms that trend. The survey revealed that 71% of the responders
think that the structural organization of the flag State administration is critical for
effective oversight of the ROs. However, 80% of the ROs personnel who answered
think that the structural organization set by the flag States administration is not critical
for adequate oversight of the ROs’ activity (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Significance of the Oversight Organizational Structure.

40

Table 2. Evaluation of the importance to set up a dedicated oversight service in the Flag
State administration
N
Mean
Median Mode
Valid Missing
The structure of the Maritime administration to 84
0
4
3.87
4.00
ensure the oversight of ROs (dedicated service
and personnel)

4.3.

Flag state personnel

4.3.1.

Findings of the Qualitative Method

In 2020, the USCG inspection workforce counted 725 marine inspectors. This
workforce was made up of 80% of military personnel and 20% of civilians (United
States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Military personnel are not required
to have a maritime background before applying to the USCG. Also, most civilians are
retired USCG personnel who are contracted after their retirement. As explained by
INT 1, “the USCG primary develops their flag state inspectors from within, rather
than hiring persons with previous maritime industry experience”. He concluded that
this situation may pose challenges for the USCG personnel to develop an appropriate
understanding of the technical and business organization of the ROs because, “the
USCG primarily develops their flag state inspectors from within; thus, it does not
typically have personnel previously employed with an RO that can share with their
colleagues about the technical and business understanding of the RO” (INT 2).
However, the USCG provide documented training that all newly appointed flag state
inspectors undertake. This programme requires that an inspector earn qualifications
based on specific vessel types (barges, tankers, small or large passenger vessels, etc.)
before serving as a lead inspector. INT 3 gave the following details about the training
and insisted on the significance of ethical training,
Historically, part of this training was made of several resident courses (each 35 weeks in length) at the USCG training centre in Yorktown, Virginia, along with
“on-the-job” training at the local USCG inspection office. In recent years, and
accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the training delivery method has
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transitioned to online courses for new inspectors, with provisions for resident
continuing education courses at periodical intervals for more senior inspectors.
[...]. Ethical training is part of every USCG inspector’s initial and periodical
refresher training.
Also, once qualified, an inspector must perform at least one inspection on a given
vessel type per year to keep his qualification. Otherwise, this inspector will be required
to carry out inspections under the supervision of a qualified inspector to regain his
qualifications (INT 2).
To overcome the challenge posed by the lack of technical and business understanding
of the ROs, interviewees stated that more qualified and experienced inspectors are the
ones selected to interact with ROs. Furthermore, INT 2 mentioned that the USCG is
in the process to grow and expand its personnel's technical knowledge and auditing
skills. This is done by enabling the recruitment of more civilians with appropriate
backgrounds and by providing opportunities for the personnel already in service to
attend International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) and ISO 90001 training.
In addition to the inspection workforce, the USCG has 09 personnel at the Flag State
Control Division, 17 Third-Party Organization Coordinators, and 68 personnel at the
Marine Safety Center in charge of direct oversight of ROs works (INT 1, 2, and 3).
Interviewees mentioned the difficulty for the oversight personnel to perform their daily
work while keeping updated with the regulatory and technological evolution in
shipping. Therefore, they suggest as a good practice for flag State administration to
provide continued education and formalized training to the personnel in charge of
oversight functions for avoiding knowledge gaps. For example, INT 1 mentioned
With respect to continuously improving the flag Administration’s oversight of the
ROs, it seems that one key component is continued education for the flag state
inspectors and auditors. The IMO regulatory framework is constantly evolving,
and it is very challenging to keep up with all the new regulations and requirements
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that come into force, while also carrying out one’s day-to-day duties. Even if an
inspector/auditor received a robust initial training program, keeping abreast of
the newest regulatory developments is challenging, and unless a formalized
continued education program is provided, this can easily become a “word of
mouth” or “trickle-down” approach that could misconstrue new requirements or
lead to knowledge gaps.

4.3.2.

Findings of the Quantitative Method

The first set of data, expressing to what extent responders think that the proposed items
related to the flag personnel in charge of oversight activities are important, displayed
that three of these items were judged “very important.” These 3 items are related to
the need for specific training, technical proficiency and an appropriate selection
process of the flag States personnel in charge of oversight with respectively an average
rate of 4.19; 4.24; and 4.14. Also, among the three, responders tend to agree more on
the significance of the selection process because it displays the lowest standard
deviation (Table 3).
Even though the importance of “the selection process” is the most shared belief among
responders, the second set of data showed that most of the responders do not think that
it should be among the three most important requirements for ensuring an effective
oversight programme. That set of data also highlighted the significance of technical
training for the personnel in charge of ROs oversight. To illustrate, 47% of the
responders chose the need for specific training and the need for technical proficiency
as the most important criteria to sustain an adequate level of proficiency for flag States’
personnel involved in oversight roles of ROs (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Most Important Requirements for the Flag State Personnel in Charge of Oversight
Activities.

Table 3. Evaluation of the Requirements for the Flag State Personnel in Charge of
Oversight Activities

The selection process of the personnel
The need for specific training
The need for an ethical training
The need for the Maritime Administration
personnel to have a technical
understanding of ROs
The need for the Maritime Administration
personnel to have a business
understanding of ROs
The number of personnel dedicated to the
oversight activities
Evaluation programme for the personnel
in charge of the oversight programme

4.4.

N
Valid
84
84
84
84

Mean

Median

Missing
0
0
0
0

4.14
4.24
3.95
4.19

4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00

Standard
deviation
0.714
0.816
1.052
0.857

84

0

3.33

4.00

1.255

84

0

3.71

4.00

0.830

84

0

3.86

4.00

0.714

Oversight Activities: Planning, and Implementation

4.4.1.

Findings of the Qualitative Method

According to the USCG guidance on navigation and vessel inspection, oversight
activities consist of inspections and audits of ships as well as the audit and monitoring
of shipping companies and ROs’ activities (USCG, 2018). This oversight is done at
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multiple levels. For example, the Flag State Control Division attends Accredited
Certification Body (ACB) audits of the ROs headquarters. Also, the division can open
Quality Cases17 to trigger internal investigations or root cause analyses when objective
evidence indicates a potential failure of a RO's Quality Management System (See
appendix J). As an illustration 06 Quality Cases were open in 2020 and 05 were
adjudicated.
The Flag State Control Division is also granted unrestricted access to the ROs database
for consulting safety records of U.S-flagged vessels. Based on the observations from
these data, it can conduct Concentrated Inspection Campaigns18 to focus on particular
vessel systems or operations. Moreover, when there is evidence of Safety Management
System failure within a shipping company, the Flag States Division can attend or direct
additional Document of Compliance (DOC)19 verifications and audits. Additionally, it
can implement direct Vertical Contract Audits (VCA) to verify the compliance of the
product and the process. Since 2019, the USCG has issued the work instruction CVCWI-008(1) explaining how to perform VCAs. Since 2018, the USCG has conducted
four VCAs (NASEM, 2021). However, there are no explicit criteria to trigger such a
type of audit. Also, interviews revealed that despite the establishment of the policy to

17

More details on the Quality Case are available in the USCG work instruction CVC-WI-005(3)
available at the following link: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG5PC/CG-CVC/CVC_MMS/CVC-WI005(3)%20Request%20for%20RO%20Internal%20QMS%20Review%20%20Quality%20Case.pdf
18
According to the USCG Alternate Compliance Program, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(CGTTP 3-72.9A) a “Concentrated Inspection Campaigns (CIC) focus on specific inspection areas
based on trend analysis or when new requirements have recently entered into force. The commandant
of the Flag State Control Division determines when to initiate these campaigns as well as the
frequency and duration.” (https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/Guidance/CGTTP_3-72_9A_ACP.pdf)
19
The International Safety Management Code (ISM) requires that company operating vessels must
develop and submit a Safety Management System (SMS) Manual for approval by their relevant flag
States administrations or recognized organizations (RO). Each flag State or its ROs have to ensure the
compliance of the company’s SMS with ISM Code requirements. Flag States administrations or ROs
audit shipping companies and issue a “Document of Compliance” valid for 5 years to those found
compliant with the code. In addition, each ocean-going vessel has to abide by the company’s SMS.
Vessels in compliance are issued a Safety Management Certificate (SMC). This certificate is subject
to verifications audits during its 5 years of validity (IMO. (2019). The International Safety
Management (ISM) Code. https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/ISMCode.aspx).
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perform VCAs, “field level flag state inspectors are not [yet] performing these type of
oversight activities” (INT 1).
Another level of oversight is done by the Maritime Safety Center. It has the
responsibility to conduct the technical oversight of ROs’ by reviewing review plans
and technical works performed on behalf of the USCG. It is also responsible for
approving or denying equivalency requests made by ROs. Moreover, it participates in
periodic meetings with ROs to review ROs’ performance related to technical aspects
of statutory certification and services. Furthermore, it advises the Chief of Commercial
Vessel Compliance on programme improvements concerning technical aspects. The
following statement of INT 5 illustrated the technical oversight role of the MSC, “the
USCG technical branch, I mean the Marine Safety Center, at USCG Headquarters
also carries out sampling-based oversight of plan review and other technical tasks
performed by ROs on behalf of the Administration” (INT 3).
The Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections (OCMI), who is also the USCG sector
Commander, ensures that qualified Marine Inspectors perform the required oversight
exams at the sector level. He has the authority to endorse and issue the Certificate of
Inspection (COI)20 and other required certificates for which the RO deliver DOCs. He
is also responsible to ensure that Marine Inspectors evaluate the effectiveness of
statutory certification and services performed by an RO on behalf of the Coast Guard.
The Third-Party Organization Coordinator has to ensure that Coast Guard field units
are performing inspections and oversight under established program policies and the
USCG Mission Management System. He also assists field units to evaluate potential

20

According to the USCG rules, a RO can issue a certificate of compliance if the ship or the company
inspected is compliant with the relevant requirements. Based on the information provided by the RO,
the USCG evaluate if the ships or the company merits a Certificate of Inspection (COI). In other
words, the COI is the endorsement by the USCG of the any certificate or document of compliance
issue by a RO (NASEM. (2021). Strengthening U.S. Coast Guard Oversight and Support of
Recognized Organizations: The Case of the Alternative Compliance Program.
https://doi.org/10.17226/26450).
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situations requiring additional DOC audits. Furthermore, he evaluates potential
Quality Cases situations and serves as a quality assurance staff as well as the first-line
review for Quality Cases. He coordinates USCG oversight actions with ROs’ local
offices. He also ensures that the USCG provides appropriate oversight when ROs’
surveyors and auditors perform their delegated tasks.
As part of the annual inspection programme, the USCG inspects all commercial
vessels in its fleet. This represents an opportunity to control the work done by ROs.
INT 2 stated,
There is a formal oversight program of field-level inspections, in the sense that
flag state inspections are carried out on an annual basis on almost all U.S. flagged
vessels. So, these inspections provide a natural opportunity for oversight of the
RO’s performance at the point of service.
Interviews also revealed that participants share the view that inspecting a vessel just
after inspections done by ROs is a good practice not only to assess the vessel's level
of compliance but also to evaluate the efficiency of ROs to conduct delegated tasks
as requested by the administration. INT 3 supported that idea by claiming,
“Carrying out onboard inspections of the vessels, after the RO completes their
surveys for issuance of statutory certificates, allows the attending flag state
inspectors to assess the efficacy of delegated functions performed by the RO afterthe-fact at the point of service.”
Participants also shared the view that attending VCA may be an efficient practice to
appraise the level of professionalism of ROs auditors and their aptitude to conduct
properly their task. As an illustration, a participant affirmed,
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“Attending ISM-Document of Compliance

21

and ISM-Safety Management

Certificate22 audits in the company of the RO auditor(s) allows the attending flag
state personnel to assess the performance of the RO in real-time when the service
is delivered.”
About planning, it is required that ROs notify the Flag State Control Division before
performing any ISM code-related external audit for the issuance or verification of a
shipping company’s DOC or vessel’s SMC. The notification time is 14 days for a
DOC and 07 days for an SMC. However, interviews underlined that sometimes the
USCG inspectors have little or no advance notice of the planned surveys because
shipowners were providing ROs with short notice when requesting surveys and
audits. Consequently, USCG inspectors and ROs surveyors were unable either to
consult each other before inspections or to plan for joint inspections.
Also, the USCG relies on a risk-based approach to develop the Fleet Risk Index23
used to target items requiring additional monitoring. In addition to that risk-based
approach, items are also selected on a random basis sometimes or upon special
request of the OCMI. This mix-targeting approach ensures that all types of work
items completed by ROs are subject to USCG oversight. The risk-based approach
developed by the USCG relies on a software called Marine Information for Safety
and Law Enforcement (MISLE). This system presents several advantages and limits
that will be discussed in detail in section 4.5.1.

21

See footnotes 18
See footnotes 18
23
Fleet Risk Index is an annual risk assessment list that contains 10 percent of the ship attending the
Alternative Compliance Program. The ships of this program are inspected by ROs. That list, which is
not made public, is developed through a prioritization and risk assessment process to identify vessels
posing a greater safety risk. Vessels on that list and their ROs are subjected to more scrutiny and
additional oversight activities. Also, USCG inspections on these vessels are conducted by experienced
personnel (NASEM. (2021). Strengthening U.S. Coast Guard Oversight and Support of Recognized
Organizations: The Case of the Alternative Compliance Program. https://doi.org/10.17226/26450).
22
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4.4.2.

Findings of the Quantitative Method

The first and second sets24 of data relative to the most appropriate oversight activity
concurred to underline that most of the responders consider “auditing ROs quality
management system” the most appropriate activity to oversee ROs with an average
score of 4.24 (Figure 5 and Table 4). Also, “auditing ROs quality management system”
is the practice with the lowest standard deviation of 0.873 meaning that responders
tend more to agree on that choice as the most appropriate means to monitor ROs (Table
4). Among the two least ranked activities, responders tend to agree more that
“developing and monitoring ROs’ KPIs” with a standard deviation of 0.926 is the less
appropriate means to oversee ROs performance (Figure 5 and Table 4).
Figure 5. Best Activities for Oversight of ROs.

Table 4. Evaluation of the Activities for Oversight of ROs.

Audits of ROs’ quality
management system
Participating in ROs’ activities to
certify ships for the flag State fleet
Additional inspections by flag
States personnel of ships certified
by ROs
Developing and monitoring ROs’
key performance indicators
Developing and implementing an
oversight programme
24

Valid
84

N
Missing
0

Mean

Median

4.24

4.00

Standard
deviation
0.873

84

0

3.95

4.00

1.052

84

0

3.52

3.00

1.187

84

0

3.76

4.00

0.926

84

0

3.90

4.00

0.926

See footnotes 11 and 12 for details
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Both sets of data supported that the following three aspects are the most critical for
successful planning of oversight by flag State administrations: defining audit criteria,
establishing objectives of oversight activities and defining clear communication
procedures with ROs (Figure 6 and Table 5). Their respective means are 3.81; 3.86;
and 3.90 (Table 5). The mean and the median of these three practices showed that there
are considered “very important” by most of the responders. Among these three
practices, the one related to establishing and maintaining effective communication
procedures with ROs has the least standard deviation 0.688 (Table 5). This meant that
most of the responders’ rates of the significance of communication with ROs were
convergent.
Figure 6. Best Practices for Successful Planning of ROs Oversight Activities by the Flag
State.
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Table 5. Evaluation of the Practices related to the Planning of ROs Oversight Activities by
the Flag State.

Defining audit criteria
Establishing objectives of oversight
activities
Defining clear communication
procedure with ROs
Frequency of communication and
report
Funding of the oversight
programme activities
Involving ROs in the preparation of
the activities
Involving other stakeholders in the
preparation of the oversight
activities

Valid
84
84

N
Missing
0
0

Mean

Median

3.81
3.86

4.00
4.00

Standard
deviation
0.799
0.838

84

0

3.90

3.00

0.688

84

0

3.48

4.00

0.667

84

0

3.24

4.00

1.025

84

0

2.90

3.00

1.025

84

0

2.52

2.00

1.227

For a successful implementation of an oversight activity, responders share the view
that the composition of the flag State team in charge of the activity (audit, inspections,
or surveys) and communication with the ROs should receive more attention because
they are the most important factors for success. There are both ranked of the three best
ranked of both sets of data with a mean and percentage of 3.90 and 28.79% for the
“composition of oversight” team and 3.86 and 27.27% for “communicating the
objectives of the oversight activities to ROs” (Figure 7 and Table 6).
However, the almost equal distribution of responders’ views suggests that the two
other aspects related to high-level audits (22.73%) and keeping a record of oversight
activities (21.21%) should be considered also a significant feature during the
implementation phase of oversight activities. (Figure 7 and Table 6)
As same as during the planning phase, responders’ views were more convergent on
designating practices related to communication as the most important element to
consider during the implementation phase. Its standard deviation was 0.643 (Figure 7
and Table 6)
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Also, “keeping records of oversight activities” has an average rate of 3.95 and that
average rate was the highest among all the items (Table 6). Despite this highest
average, 78.79% of the responders did not choose it among the three most critical
practices for an efficient oversight programme (Figure 7). This might highlight that
gathering data is not enough for implementing successful oversight activities. There is
also a need to review and process data gathered with analytical capabilities (software
or humans) for providing exploitable information necessary for effective oversight of
ROs. Without data processing, “keeping records of oversight activities” as a standing
alone practice cannot add value to oversight programmes.
Figure 7. Best Practices for Successful Implementation of ROs Oversight Activities by the
Flag State.

Table 6. Evaluation of the Practices related to the Implementation of ROs Oversight
Activities by the Flag State.

Implementing high-level audits
Composition of the oversight
audit/inspections/surveys team
Communication of the objectives to
the ROs before the activities
Keeping record of the oversight
activities

N
Valid
84
84

Mean

Median

Missing
0
0

3.67
3.90

4.00
4.00

Standard
deviation
0.896
0.816

84

0

3.86

4.00

0.643

84

0

3.95

4.00

0.790
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4.5.

Evaluation and improvement of oversight programmes

4.5.1.

Findings of the Qualitative Method

The USCG is subjected to internal and external audits to ensure that it fulfils its
mission and delivers high-quality service. At the internal level, the USCG implements
its own quality management system called Mission Management System (MMS). The
MMS is an ISO 9001/2015-based quality management system allowing the USCG to
satisfy its domestic and international obligations for marine safety and security as well
as maritime environment protection. Interviews revealed that under this management
system, oversight practices are regularly audited for improvement. That idea was
supported by INT 2,
“Periodical audits are carried out at both the head office and individual field office
levels, both internal [meaning that] designated auditors from an office carrying
out the audit of the same office and external [meaning that] separate USCG office,
from the Force Readiness Command, carrying out the audits.”
For the external audit, the USCG is a participant in the IMO Member State Audit
Scheme (IMSAS) which also review the conformity of the oversight practices with the
RO code. For illustration, the U.S has gone through an IMSAS in 2022 from February
to March with more than 70 participants (USCG, 2022). Interviewees claimed that the
USCG capitalizes on this opportunity to improve its MMS process.
As evaluation and improvement tools the USCG uses the Marine Information for
Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database. It is used to record data on vessels’
inspections and examinations, marine accidents, pollution incidents, search and rescue
cases, and law enforcement activities. In 2021, a mobile application version was
developed as a job aid to allow USCG inspectors to access in real time the information
of MISLE from the field. As a database, it helps the USCG’s headquarters to review
the safety history of vessels, companies and ROs to determine KPIs as well as areas
that need special oversight focus.
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A study report commanded by the USCG revealed that MISLE is not suited to support
vessel compliance verification by marine inspectors and ROs (NASEM; 2021). Also,
this application does not allow efficient monitoring of ROs by the USCG because its
design is outdated and its data incomplete and unreliable. Consequently, the ROs’
KPIs have less relevance to RO performance and compliance. This report recommends
that the USCG collaborates with ROs to develop relevant KPIs for oversight purposes
and better profiling of vessels on a performance and risk assessment basis. INT 3
provided the following comments,
“In recent years, updates to this application [MISLE] have provided the ability to
record the results of various RO oversight activities within a newly created
Management System Oversight (MSO) tab. This includes a recording of USCG
observations of ISM-Document of Compliance and ISM-Safety Management
Certificate audits, Quality Cases, Third-party Organizations and RO oversight
activities, etc... but improvements are still required because it does not include
enough data about USCG findings from RO oversight”
The evaluation of a RO’s poor performance can lead to the suspension of the approval
given to that RO to perform delegated tasks. This suspension can also be partial and
include individual auditors or surveyors. First, the USCG will provide details to the
RO about its failure to comply with the delegation agreement. Then, the suspension
will happen if the ROs fails to correct the mentioned deficiencies.
Also, the USCG can revoke the approval given to a RO when that RO demonstrates a
pattern of failure to comply with delegation agreement or when substantial
deviations—such as ethical violations, conflict of interest, or inadequate performance
indicating the inability of that RO to carry out its duties— occur. USCG regulations,
46 CFR part 139, provide the procedure to appeal suspension and revocation orders
emitted by the USCG.
For improvement, the Flag State Control Division convenes an annual conference for
USCG inspectors to increase inspectors’ awareness of policies and procedures related
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to ROs functions and to provide more information on programs that involve third-party
delegations. Also, the Flag State Control Division organizes quarterly and annual
summits with ROs for discussions and exchange of ideas in order to overcome
common challenges and achieve their common safety goals. Moreover, since 2017,
the USCG has published Flag State Control Annual Report which not only includes
various data regarding activities performed by ROs Flag but also serves as a waypoint
to study trends and bring attention to issues in the fleet.
Despite this effort, the report of the expert committee on ROs oversight called for more
transparency concerning ROs’ Key Performance Indicators (KPI) assessment and
MISLE access. Also, the 2018 Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act called for more
transparency by identifying on a publicly accessible website any “RO that inspected
or surveyed a vessel that was later subject to a Coast Guard-issued control action
attributable to a major nonconformity that the recognized organization failed to
identify in such inspection or survey.”

4.5.2.

Findings of the Quantitative Method

The survey result (from both the table and the figure) pinpoints that external audits of
oversight systems and the establishment of follow-up procedures are the most
appropriate practices to evaluate and improve ROs oversight by flag States. The
capacity of a flag State administration to set up adequate follow-up procedures to deal
with deficiencies revealed during oversight activities has the lowest standard deviation
of 0.613 (Table 7). This means that the responders’ views are more convergent to
designate that practice as adequate to improve oversight practices. The development
of analytic software to enable an efficient data-driven approach was ranked the fourth
most appropriate evaluation method with 14.29% (Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Best Practices for Successful Evaluation and Improvement of ROs Oversight
Programme.

Table 7. Evaluation of the Practices related to Evaluation and Improvement of ROs
Oversight Programme.

Implementing an external audit or
evaluation of the flag State oversight
system
Establishing a complaint and feedback
procedure
Use of software to analyse previous
oversight findings
Procedure to deal with the follow-up
about rectifications of deficiencies
revealed by the oversight activities
Approval process of the final report
Incorporation of the conclusions of
previous monitoring activities into new
activities

Valid
84

N
Missing
0

Mean

Median

3.81

4.00

Standard
deviation
0.857

84

0

3.71

4.00

0.830

84

0

3.52

3.00

0.736

84

0

3.90

4.00

0.613

84
84

0
0

3.48
3.71

4.00
4.00

0.857
0.704

4.6. Impact of Global Disruption and Relevance of Joint Programme,
and International Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB)
4.6.1.

Global Disruption: The Case of COVID-19

In the American case, interviews showed that oversight programmes for ships
operating in the USA were moderately impacted by a global disruption such as
COVID-19. Even though inspections continued, they were done under restrictive rules
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provided by sanitary authorities. For U.S-flagged vessels exclusively operating
abroad, the oversight programme was more impacted because of the travel restrictions
imposed during the COVID-19 global disruption. One of the measures to mitigate the
impact of COVID-19 was the transition to remote inspections. Also, the ROs oversight
programme are generally yearly activities and the pic of the sanitary crisis lasted less
than two continuous years; therefore, USCG could find windows to conduct its most
important oversight activities.
INT 2 depicted the impact of COVID-19 in the following terms:
“COVID-19 limited the opportunities for in-person meetings and visits with our
RO colleagues. In some instances, particularly for U.S. flagged vessels exclusively
engaged in overseas trade that do not return to the U.S. mainland, travel
restrictions associated with COVID-19 precluded in-person attendance by flag
state inspectors. In these cases, remote inspections were sometimes conducted.
However, as the COVID-19 situation somewhat improves, and travel restrictions
lessen, the USCG has returned to in-person annual inspections of U.S. flagged
vessels, and it is resuming in-person meetings with its RO colleagues.”
Participants’ responses to survey questions are almost equally distributed with 33%
thinking that the effect of COVID-19 on the ROs oversight programme was “very
important” and the other 33% believe that the effects were slightly important (Figure
9). The average score of 3 given by responders showed that the impact of COVID on
ROs’ oversight is considered “moderate” generally (Table 8).
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Figure 9. Impact of COVID-19 on Oversight of ROs by the Flag State.

4.6.2.

Combined Oversight Programmes

The RO Code part III section 7.2.2.2 authorizes countries to enter into written
agreements with others to develop combined oversight activities when they have
delegated their tasks to the same ROs (IMO, 2013). The USCG has Memoranda of
Cooperation (MOC) with over agencies in charge of ROs oversight such as the
Department of Transport of Canada or the Directorate General for Mobility and
Transport of the European Commission. The MOC with Canada aims at information
sharing for coordination purposes regarding the oversight of common ROs in both
countries (USCG & the Department of Transport of Canada, 2016). For the MOC with
the European Directorate General, the agreement allows joint oversight activities
(USCG and Directorate for Mobility and Transport of the European Commission,
2020). Interviewees acknowledged the significance of such a cooperation framework.
As an illustration, INT 3 shared his experience of attending, as an observer, an audit
conducted by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),
I did not actively participate in the audit or ask any questions to the RO audited...
[but] I found the attendance very informative, and it was interesting to see what
focus items other flag Administrations had with respect to works that ROs perform
on their behalf.
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Opinions expressed by the survey´s participants do not permit drawing a clear
conclusion on the significance of combined oversight programmes. The result shows
an almost uniform distribution of views between “very important,” “moderately
important,” and “slightly important” (Figure 10). This dispersion of views is confirmed
by the standard deviation of 1.132 which is the biggest among all the three aspects
considered in this section (Table 8).
Figure 10. Relevance of combined oversight Programme for Enhancing ROs' oversight by
the Flag State.

4.6.3.

International Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB)

IQARB is a project under development and it is in its trial phase. It was initiated by
Liberia, Marshall Islands, New Zealand and the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS) as a proposal paper at the 100th session of the IMO
Marine Safety Committee in 2018. It aims to assist flag States to oversee their ROs
according to relevant IMO instruments such as IMO Instruments Implementation Code
(III code) and the RO Code. There is a vision to make it a fully independent quality
assessment review body working under an international legislation framework with its
own standards for qualifying all ROs. At the current stage, its scope of application is
limited to the IACS members (IMO, 2013a; IMO, 2013b; IMO, 2019b; Liberia et al,
2018).
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USCG personnel interviewed admitted their limited knowledge of the topic and
preferred to not elaborate on the topic to avoid any confusion with the USCG official
position.
Concerning the quantitative assessment, the survey revealed a positive view from the
responders with 38% estimating that it is “very important” and 33% believing that is
“moderately important” (Figure 11). The standard deviation of 0.904, which is the
lowest among the three topics discussed under section 4.6, shows that the views of the
respondent are less dispersed about the capacity of IQARB to improve flag State
oversight programmes (Table 8).
Figure 11. Relevance of IQARB for Enhancing ROs Oversight by the Flag States.

Table 8. Evaluation of the Impact of COVID-19, and the Relevance of combined Oversight
Programme and IQARB

The impact of COVID 19 on the
effectiveness of oversight programme
Implementation of combined oversight
programs with other countries
Relevance of the International Quality
Assessment Review Body (IQARB)
system

Valid
84

N
Missing
0

Mean

Median

3.00

3.00

Standard
deviation
1.030

84

0

2.86

3.00

1.132

84

0

3.38

3.00

0.904
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After displaying the main findings in this chapter, the next chapter will synthesize and
provide interpretations of these findings. Also, it will evaluate patterns and ambiguities
in light of the research questions, the conceptual framework guiding the research, and
theoretical frameworks presented in the literature review. Then, it will present the
limitations that need to be considered when assessing the final results of this research.
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Chapter 5 Discussion
The USCG study case demonstrates that the delegation of statutory duties to highly
qualified ROs should not prevent the implementation of a robust oversight programme.
Despite the highly selective criteria of the USCG to choose their ROs (see Section
4.1), the findings in the previous chapter (see Section 4.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, and 4.5.1)
display the changes undertaken by the USCG after the El Faro accident 25 and
demonstrate the necessity for an efficient oversight programme (see Appendix K for
the main changes in the USCG oversight framework). These changes and the survey
findings (Figures 6 and 7) support the need for consistent communication between flag
State administrations and ROs through an open-dialogue and regular engagement. This
is concordant with the principal-agent approach to addressing the problem of
information asymmetry between a principal and the delegated agent. Müller & Turner
(2005) recommended significant investments into communication between the
principal and its agents to provide each other with the required information necessary
to build trust and overcome emerging issues.
Also, findings display that the structural organization of flag State administrations is
essential to a successful oversight framework (Figure 3). Gong et al. (2017) arrived at
the same conclusion when analysing the production coordination between a principal
and its agents. Their study concluded that mechanism design or structural organization
is a solution to principal-agent problems by focusing on coordination aspects.
However, the quasi-totality of the RO’s personnel who responded think that the
structural organization of flag State administration is not decisive for a successful
oversight programme (Figure 3). The semi-structured interviews undertaken to
evaluate the result of the survey shows that the opinion of the RO’s personnel needs a
deeper analysis.
The view of the RO’s personnel should not be interpreted as an opposition to the
creation of a specific service within the flag State administration in charge of oversight

25

See sections 1.2 and 3.3 for more details
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activities. From a RO perspective, the determinant factor is the capacity for the
administration to maintain consistent and efficient communication regardless of the
organizational framework adopted by the flag State administration. From a flag State
point of view, adopting an organizational structure with a standing-alone service
dedicated to RO oversight is a sign that ROs’ oversight is becoming a priority on the
flag State administration’s agenda. In other words, oversight activities could get more
resources to enable a consistent engagement with ROs. Consequently, the ROs and
flag State administrations' perspectives are not necessarily contradictory.
Also, the evaluation discussion highlighted the fact that the Maritime Administration
office in charge of ROs’ oversight may be set up as a project management office with
more emphasis on coordination, and data gathering and processing. The flag State
personnel working in that dedicated office does not need necessarily to be technical
experts. As described by INT 4, the personnel of this office should be someone with
“appropriate

coordination,

communication

and

analytical

skills,

in-depth

comprehension of ROs functioning, and broad technical knowledge but not necessarily
a technical expert”. He continued to mention that deep technical expertise is an
absolute requirement for flag States field personnel such as auditors and inspectors.
To properly set up an oversight service, flag State administrations also need to consider
other aspects such as the size of their fleet, the number and quality of their ROs, and
most important the quantity of information that is coming from their ROs (INT 4, INT
5, and INT 6). More incoming information will require more working time for
processing, analysis and synthesis. Adequate digital solutions and artificial
intelligence will certainly help in that process. But before applying these solutions,
there is a need for centralization of information relevant to ROs activities for guiding
flag State oversight programmes. From that perspective, it appears necessary to
provide dedicated oversight personnel or service according to the amount of data to
review. This is supported by the following statement of the INT 6,
“You need resources to review the documentation and reports coming from the
ROs. Maritime administrations request their ROs to send regular updates
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about activities conducted on behalf of flag States. But, one point is to receive
the information and another is to do something with the information by
reviewing it. If you just file it, it doesn’t help for anything. So, if you have the
reports of a surveyor, it is meaningless if you do not look into them. Just having
them, doesn’t help a flag State. Again, you need to allocate resources for
oversight activities.”
Concerning the personnel, flag States oversight frameworks must consider how to
maintain the technical proficiency of its workforce. In the American example, the
USCG increased the recruitment of personnel with adequate backgrounds and offered
the possibility to the personnel already serving to get more specific training (see
Section 4.3.1). Also, answers to the survey pinpoint the necessity for flag State
personnel to be technically at the level of their ROs counterparts (see Section 4.3.2).
This requirement is inherent to the functions that flag State personnel needs to fulfil
their oversight roles. Oversight of ROs requires not only technical skills to understand
the tasks to perform but also a systematic review of performed tasks to assess their
conformity with regulations. Hence, flag State personnel in charge of ROs oversight
needs technical and auditing skills. However, it may be difficult for them to keep up
with technological and regulatory development if their flag State oversight framework
does not provide the opportunity for formal continued training (see Section 4.3.1). Onthe-job self-learning should be a complement to formal training programmes but not a
substitute (Baran et al., 2000); otherwise, this practice can lead to knowledge gaps and
inappropriate practices.
The USCG oversight case study underlined difficulties to developed suitable KPIs for
assessing ROs’ performance. It also revealed the need to associate ROs to overcome
challenges posed by KPI development (see Section 4.4.1). In a principal-agent
relationship, Banker & Kemerer (1992) demonstrated that the criteria to establish
performance metrics should include precision and sensitivity. Thus, it may be a
challenge to develop the appropriate performance metrics. That challenge to develop
appropriate KPIs for evaluating ROs can explain the choice of the survey responders
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to designate “the development and monitoring of ROs KPI” among the least
appropriate methods to oversee ROs performance (see Figure 5). However, the
USCG's choice of combining ROs offices' audits and field inspections to improve its
oversight programme concurs with the views displayed during the evaluation
interviews. For example, INT 5 expressed that auditing ROs offices without field
inspections to have a look at the final product is meaningless.
“A classification society or RO head office [talking about IACS member]is
audited at least once a month, so all the people in that head office who are
dealing with the auditors are familiar with the audit process. They have heard
any question and answered any question every two or three weeks. So, you
don’t gain very much unless you want to have a very specific look into a
specific ship where only the head office has the necessary technical
documentation available... One of the most effective means of ROs oversight
or monitoring is flag State inspections. Even though you don’t look at the ROs
specifically, you look at the product they are delivering, the certified ship. So,
if a certified ship is not in accordance with the regulations or requirements,
then they obviously did not do a good job.”
Based on that assessment, Vertical Contract Audits (VCA) 26 represent an effective
oversight practice. It permits looking at the ROs procedures, services delivered and
final products. In a VCA, flag States personnel join ROs’ surveyors and observe their
activities on the field (on board ships or in shipping companies). During a VCA, flag
States’ oversight personnel observe ROs’ surveyors during the preparation,
implementation and post-inspection phases. Therefore, it provides a real picture of
ROs’ working practices and “not an abstract process in a head office,” as stated by
INT 6. A VCA also offers flexibility with possible cost savings because the flag State
administration can schedule such activity when ships arrive at home ports or at least

26

The RO code makes mandatory for ROs to conduct VCA annually as a mean of performance
measurement, analysis and improvement (RO code part 2). The Code does not consider VCAs in part
3 which provides the guidelines for oversight activities undertaken by flag States administrations.
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in the closest port to the flag State. However, it requires highly qualified personnel
able to assess technically their ROs counterparts.
At the planning and implementation stage, answers to the survey spotlight the
significance of defining clear objectives for oversight activities and clear
communication procedures with the assessed RO (see Section 4.4.2). This is in line
with USCG appointing Third Party Organization Coordinators (TPOC) to engage local
ROs representatives and improve the planning of oversight activities (see Sections
4.2.1 and 4.3.1). The TPOC, as a civilian employee of the USCG, is not subject to the
obligation of USCG military personnel of changing assignment positions every two or
three years. In other words, the USCG will have the opportunity to develop a strong
and long-lasting relationship with ROs at the local level. This will facilitate
communication between ROs and USCG and the planning of oversight activities at the
local level.
For the evaluation and improvement of oversight programmes, the USCG opted for an
approach based on internal and external audits as well as KPIs development (see
Section 4.5.1). As for the responders to the survey, they prefer “external audits” as the
appropriate means to evaluate and improve ROs oversight frameworks (see figure 8).
Because of the difficulty to develop adequate KPIs for assessing ROs’ performance,
the choice of “external audits” by the survey responders might appear as the
convenient approach to evaluate and improve oversight programmes set up by flag
States.
Concerning the eventual disruption of oversight programmes due to situations such as
COVID-19, both the USCG example and survey responders’ answers show that flag
states were able to adapt by shifting to remote inspections and audits (see Section
4.6.1). If the COVID-19 effects have been more significant on seafarers and shipping
activities (Michail & Melas, 2020; Pauksztat, et al., 2022), the findings in section 4.6.1
suggest that its effect on the oversight programme was moderate due to the adaptability
of flag State administrations and ROs in conducting remote oversight activities.
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Despite, the benefit that combined oversight activities can offer, as exemplified in the
USCG case, the opinions of responders to the survey were not favourable to such
activities (see section 4.6.2). The interviews of experts for discussing and assessing
survey results indicated that the challenges to planning joint oversight and the
divergence among flag State requirements to their ROs might explain the reticence of
responders to value combined oversight activities as an appropriate means to monitor
ROs. Therefore, providing mechanisms to facilitate the implementation of combined
oversight activities will unveil the potential of this oversight activity, as exemplified
by the European Maritime Safety Agency. This agency provides a unique
collaboration platform for oversight of ROs acting on behalf of member States of the
European Union (EU). Only ROs recognized by the EMSA can act be authorized by
member states of the EU. Also, the EMSA conduct different oversight activities for
monitoring ROs on behalf of the European Commission and all member States
(EMSA, 2022).
The positive opinion of survey responders about the development of the International
Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB) is consistent with their choice of
designating audits as the most appropriate means to oversight ROs (see Section 4.6.3).
In other words, responders perceive audit procedures implemented by IQARB as an
extension of their preferred oversight practice. The interviews with experts to assess
the result of the survey concede that IQARB development will have a positive effect
on ROs’ oversight; however, it will not replace the need for flag States to engage
continuously their ROs to solve emerging challenges related to oversight activities.
In summary to the discussion undertaken in that chapter, an effective ROs oversight
programme can be characterized as a systematic and adequately-resourced programme
that relies on the following practices: a dedicated coordination office or personnel with
a project management mindset who regularly engage its ROs counterparts and direct
highly qualified flag States personnel to implement systematic oversight activities.
This oversight programme should be evaluated and improved through regular external
audits.
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This overall framework can be compared to critical parts of a ship. The following five
aspects considered during this research, namely organizational structure, personnel
requirement, planning, implementation, and evaluation/improvement represent
respectively the bridge, the crew, the communication equipment, the propulsion
system and the hull of the ship.
Like the bridge, the organizational structure of the ROs’ oversight framework should
allow a good overview, appropriate situational awareness and effective coordination
of all activities related to ROs oversight.
For the personnel, an effective oversight programme relies on more people than the
personnel at the oversight office as same as any ship relies on all the crew and not just
the personnel at the bridge. It is the daily work performed by each qualified crew in its
domain of expertise that maintains the safety of the ship. Equally, it is the daily work
performed by a qualified flag state inspection workforce that sustains the overall
oversight framework.
Concerning the planning phase, it is essential for the personnel in charge of ROs
oversight to keep permanent communication not only with their RO counterparts but
also with the flag State workforce to provide the support needed when required. This
is the same for the personnel at the bridge who needs to use the communication
equipment to direct the crew but also communicate with external actors for the safety
of the ship.
The implementation phase should be systematic and adequately resourced to allow the
proper functioning of the framework. In the same way, the propulsive system of a ship
requires a systematic maintenance programme. Oversight activities like engine
maintenance should not be coincidental but properly planned and adequately
resourced.
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For the evaluation and improvement aspects, like the hull of any ship, the oversight
programme needs to be checked periodically from the outside to ensure that it is
fulfilling its purpose.
Figure 12. Representation of the guiding principles for oversight programme best practices.
Source: Author.

Appraising the result of this research requires considering the following limitations.
There were many cases of flag State administrations reluctant to disclose information
about their oversight practices because it could lead to the release of sensitive
information. However, the researcher critically assessed and analysed data gathered
by considering multiple perspectives within the scope of the research aim and
objectives.
As with any single case study, the results of this research are influenced by the intrinsic
characteristic of the chosen case making it difficult to generalize the results. Despite
the researcher's solution to supplement the case study with a quantitative survey, the
relative few numbers of responders remain a limitation to allow firm ground for the
generalization of the study. Even though the nationality of the participants was
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diversified (15 different nationalities), the number of responders is a point that can be
improved in further studies.
Several aspects determinant for understanding oversight activities such as criteria for
establishing RO’s key performance indicators are not publicly available. Also, getting
access to representatives of flag States administrations was not always possible.
Hence, the picture depicted in this research may lack some insight and details.
However, participants were selected based on their experience and ability to provide
the necessary information for this study.
Also, travel restrictions and lack of financial means prevent the researcher to conduct
field research. This would have provided more opportunities for the researcher to get
insight into the oversight practices as they are done in the field. This study relies
mainly on data collected from regulations analysis, self-reported practices, beliefs,
opinions, and perceptions collected during interviews and surveys. Unfortunately,
such self-reporting can deviate from reality. Therefore, additional investigations
through local observations to correct this deviation and examine flag States' oversight
practices may be necessary.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
ROs oversight is a crucial topic for ensuring that flag States are fulfilling their national
and international obligations. As flag States’ agents to provide statutory services, ROs
are significant contributors to enabling a safe, secure and environmental-friendly
shipping industry. Flag States' oversight programme to monitor their ROs need to be
systematic and adequately resourced. Overseeing ROs should not be a coincidental
task but it should take advantage of the daily inspections and activities done by flag
States and port States personnel to check the conformity of the final product (ships or
shipping companies) and the performance of ROs in discharging their delegated tasks.
Delegating more statutory services to ROs increases the need for adequate oversight
by flag States administration. Through the USCG example, that study highlighted the
requirement for an effective oversight programme even when the delegation process
to ROs is particularly selective. Delegating tasks to highly qualified ROs should not
prevent flag State administrations to develop adequate organizational structure,
qualified human resources, clear planning and implementation procedures, as well as
efficient evaluation and improvement process to oversee their ROs.
Organizational structures adopted by flag States may display the level of priority given
to oversight questions in the administration agenda. Regardless of the configuration
adopted, the oversight organizational structure should enable effective communication
between flag Sates and their ROs. This communication should concern regulatory and
technical aspects at both the headquarter level and the field level.
Technically qualified human resources are required to fulfil oversight functions.
Delegating inspection and audit tasks to ROs does not remove flag States’ obligation
to develop technically highly qualified personnel. To effectively control ROs’ works,
flag States administration must have personnel capable of technically understanding
the tasks that ROs are supposed to perform. Also, to assess ROs performance, flag
States personnel needs to be familiar with audit practices. Allowing flag States
personnel to have access to continuous and formal training is critical to keeping them
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updated with technological and regulatory changes happening within the shipping
industry.
The study highlights that audit of the quality management system is the most preferred
practice to oversee ROs. This might facilitate the adoption of the IQARB initiative.
However, audits need to be completed by field inspections which are the appropriate
way to control the service executed by ROs at the point of delivery.
The success of the planning phase of an oversight activity is linked to well-defined
objectives and clear communication procedures with ROs. Furthermore, for a
successful implementation of the planned activities, this study shows that the
composition of the flag State oversight teams needs to be carefully considered.
Because of the technicality and the diversity of works that may be performed by ROs,
the team in charge of the inspections and audits has to be made of the appropriate
expertise to control and evaluate the tasks delegated to ROs.
For evaluation and improvement of oversight programmes of flag States, the study
shows that external audits are the most suited practice. Also, it reveals that developing
relevant KPIs to assess ROs performance may be challenging. Therefore, it suggests
close cooperation between flag State administrations and ROs to develop the most
suited KPIs to appraise how well the latter discharge their delegated tasks. On top of
these evaluation practices, flag States need to remember that consistent, constructive
and open dialogue with their ROs remains the efficient way to foster the overall
oversight framework.
The study supports the significant role played by the adoption of technological
solutions to overcome challenges posed by a global disruption such as COVID-19. The
implementation of online oversight activities mitigated the effect of COVID-19 on the
ROs’ oversight programme. Also, the research demonstrates that cooperation between
countries to set up combined oversight of their ROs presents opportunities to enhance
oversight programmes; however, the challenges related to the planning and
implementation of such activities make it less attractive.
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In light of the conclusions of this research, the following recommendations can be
made:
 Part 3 of the RO code should be made mandatory to display the significance of
the issue of ROs oversight. Part 3 should also incorporate Vertical Contract
Audits as an oversight activity to be done by IMO member States.
 IMO should continue auditing flag States' frameworks for oversight of ROs
during IMSAS audits because it represents an opportunity for improvement of
flag States' practices. The adoption of the IQARB project can also provide an
opportunity for better oversight of ROs.
 IMO and flag States should consider mechanisms to encourage and facilitate
combined oversight programmes. Existing Port State Control Memorandum of
Understanding groupings may be considered as a working basis;
 Flag States administrations should value transparency and allow external
audits of their ROs oversight programme as a way for improvement;
 Flag State administrations should maintain regular and open dialogue at all
levels (from headquarters to field) and on all aspects (technical and regulatory)
with their ROs to develop relevant oversight metrics and practices;
 Flag State administrations should develop training programmes to keep up-todate the technical, regulatory, and auditing knowledge and skills of their
oversight personnel;
 Flag Sates’ oversight programmes should continue to incorporate
technological capabilities to make their oversight programmes resilient to
global disruption while paying attention to challenges inherent to the adoption
of these new technologies.
To extend the research on the topic, further studies might consider a comparative
analysis of selected flag States with a great number of ROs such as Panama, or
countries that have developed a specific framework of ROs oversight such as Marshall
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Island with its International Registries

27

or Denmark with the open-dialogue

approach.28 This comparative analysis will offer new perspectives on ROs’ oversight
practices and reveal more good practices for the oversight of ROs by flag States
administrations.

27

International Registries, Inc. and its affiliates (IRI) is a privately held maritime and corporate
registry service providing administrative and technical support to the Republic of the Marshall Islands
(RMI) Maritime. It is deeply involved in the oversight of the ROs acting on behalf of the Marshall
Islands. https://www.register-iri.com/
28
Olsen, T. A. (2017). Does the oversight model lead to power relations in terms of empowerment or
responsibilization? [Master´s thesis, Lund University]. https://www.lu.se/lup/publication/8927030.
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Appendix B: List of main documents used for the USCG case study
n° Authors
01 United States
Congress
02 USCG

Type of
Document
Public Law

Date

Title

Links

2018

Save Our Seas Act Of 2018

Code of Federal
regulation

Up to date as
February
2022
Dec 1996

46 CFR: Chapter I – Coast Guard,
Department of Homeland Security

https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/3508
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title46/chapter-I

46 CFR Parts 8, 31, 71, 91, and 107
Vessel Inspection Alternatives;
Classification Procedures; Final Rule

https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/5ps/Alternate%20Compli
ance%20Program/fr122796.pdf

03 USCG

Code of Federal
Regulation

04 USCG

Coast Guard
Tactics,
Techniques, and
Procedures
(CGTTP 3-72.9A)

2019

Alternate Compliance Program (ACP)
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTP)

https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/Guidance/CGTTP_372_9A_ACP.pdf

05 USCG

Technical note
(MTN NO. 04-03,
CH-4)

2021

Technical Support and Oversight of
Authorized Classification Societies

06 USCG

Navigation And
Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC)
No. 02-95, Ch-3

2018

The Alternate Compliance Program
(ACP)

https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/MSC/
MTN/MTN.04-03.CH4.2021.04.06.Technical%20Support%20an
d%20Oversight%20of%20Authorized%20
Classification%20Societies.pdf
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/OCSN
COE/References/NVICs/NVIC-02-95CH3.pdf?ver=FAHLfUZMP7SSn1O409zu
jQ%3D%3D
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07 USCG

Commandant
2019
Instruction 5200.4a

U.S. Coast Guard Mission Management
System

https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/28/200
2240099/-1/-1/0/CI_5200_4A.pdf

08 USCG

Commandant
Change Notice
16000

2016

CH-2 to Marine Safety Manual Volume
II

09 USCG

Work Instructions
[CVC-WI-003(3)]

2018

USCG Oversight of Safety Management
Systems on U.S. Flag Vessels

10 USCG

Work Instructions
[CVC-WI-008(1)]

2019

Vertical Contract Audits

11 USCG

Job Aid
[CVC-FM-007(2)]

2019

Vertical Contract Auditing Job Aid

12 USCG and the
Department of
Transport of
Canada

Memorandum of
Cooperation

2016

Memorandum of Cooperation between
the USCG and the Department of
Transport of Canada, Regarding the
Management of the Code for Recognized
Organizations Oversight Program with

https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/OCSN
COE/References/COMDTINSTs/CIM16000.70-Marine-InspAdmin.PDF?ver=TStUMNrR8ZiIcG0aK2
7XUw%3D%3D
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC_MMS/CVC-WI003(series).pdf?ver=UBYVu7aS4xqZYF2
dBkucSQ%3d%3d
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC_MMS/CVC-WI008(1)_Vertical_Contract_Audits.pdf?ver=
2019-07-25-154047-330
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC_MMS/CVC-FM007(1)_VCA_Job_Aid.pdf?ver=2019-0725-154046-813
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/5ps/Alternate%20Compli
ance%20Program/MOC_USCGDOTCanada.pdf
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respect to Mutually Recognized
Organizations

Memorandum of
13 USCG and
Directorate for Cooperation
Mobility and
Transport of
the European
Commission

2020

14 USCG

Report

2017

Memorandum of Cooperation between
the USCG and the Directorate for
Mobility and Transport of the European
Commission, Regarding the Management
of the Code for Recognized
Organizations Oversight Program with
respect to Mutually Recognized
Organizations
Flag State Control Annual Report 2017

15 USCG

Report

2018

Flag State Control Annual Report 2018

16 USCG

Report

2019

Flag State Control Annual Report 2019

17 USCG

Report

2020

Flag State Control Annual Report 2020
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https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC4/Memoranda/EC%20MOC.pdf

https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC1/AnnualRpt/2017DomesticAnn
ualReport.pdf
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC1/AnnualRpt/2018DomesticAnn
ualReport.pdf
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC1/AnnualRpt/2019DomesticAnn
ualReport.pdf?
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%
20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC1/AnnualRpt/2020%20Flag%20

18 USCG

Report

2021

Flag State Control Annual Report 2021

19 United States
Government
Accountability
Office
20 United States
National
Academy of
Sciences

Report to
Congressional
Committees

2022
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Appendix C: Example of Concepts Suggested by the Software Atlas.ti
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Appendix D: Question Guide for In-depth Interviews
Title of the research: Oversight of Recognized Organizations: Understanding Flag
States Practices.
Purpose of the research: This research focuses on the oversight of RO performance
to help countries, international organizations, and ROs in their role of providing
safety in the shipping industry. It aims to propose best practices that can be used to
oversee RO in their capacities of fulfilling their responsibilities on behalf of flag
States. Further, this research explores how flag states can efficiently use their
maritime administration´s limited resources to properly supervise the services
provided by their ROs.
Your participation: You are invited to participate in this interview which aims to
identify best practices that can be shared with other flag States in the oversight of
Recognized Organizations. Your responses will be treated in the strictest confidence
and anonymized. Your participation is completely voluntary and without any
payment. You are welcome to withdraw from the research at any time, even after
answering the questions. Thank you for your participation.
Researcher:
Name:
Contact:
Interviewee:
Name (Optional):
Nationality:
Organization:
Occupation:
Contact:
Email:
Number of years in the maritime administration:
Number of years in the RO´s oversight department:
1) Flag States maritime administration
a. How is the Maritime administration organized (structure) to ensure
the oversight of ROs?
b. What is the best way to organize a Maritime Administration to
optimize its ROs oversight role?
2) Flag States personnel
a. How is the personnel selection done?
b. Is there any need for technical and business understanding of the RO?
Do both criteria have the same value?
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3)

4)

5)

6)

c. Is there any specific training for the personnel in charge of the
oversight program? Is there any ethical course during the training?
d. How many personnel do you have for the ROs oversight?
e. Is there any programme for the evaluation of the personnel?
f. What are the best practices to improve the performance of your
personnel?
Oversight activities
a. What types of oversight activities is your administration conducting?
b. Do you have a formal oversight programme (monthly, annual...)? It is
communicated to the ROs?
c. Do you have any specific report procedures or forms? What is the RO
requested to report?
d. What are the best activities to ensure an efficient oversight?
Oversight activities: planning
a. Do you have any audit criteria when auditing ROs? What are your
most important audit criteria?
b. How do you determine the objectives of your oversight activities? Is
there any consultation with other stakeholders? If yes, who are those
stakeholders?
c. How do you communicate with the ROs? Is there any frequency and
preferred communication procedures?
d. How are your activities funded? Can you think about any other
possible type of funding?
e. What are the best practices to ensure effective planning?
Oversight activities: Implementation
a. Do you have any high-level audits?
b. How do you constitute the audit team? Do the team members have
predefined roles and functions?
c. Do you communicate the objectives of the oversight activities to the
ROs?
d. How do you save the record of your oversight activities and for how
long?
e. What is the best practice to be implemented for a successful oversight
programme?
Oversight activities: Evaluation and improvement
a. Is there any external audit or evaluation of the flag State oversight
system?
b. Do you have any service in charge of complaints and feedback? Is
there any deadline to receive complaints?
c. To what are extent oversight findings made available to other
stakeholders?
d. Do you have specific data analysis software to analyse the previous
reports?
e. How do you deal with the follow-up about rectifications of
deficiencies? Is there a dedicated service in charge of it?
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f. What is the review, approval, and distribution process?
g. How do you use the conclusions of previous monitoring activities?
h. What should be considered to continuously improve the RO’s
oversight programme?
7) Oversight program and global disruption
a. What impacts did COVID-19 have on your oversight programme?
b. What was the most important disruption?
c. How did you make up for it?
8) Others
a. Do you have any combined oversight programs with other countries?
What do you think about it?
b. What do you think about the International Quality Assessment
Review Body (IQARB) system? Is it enough?
c. What is the best oversight activity to ensure that ROs are fulfilling the
delegated task?
d. What is the most efficient oversight activity to ensure that ROs are
fulfilling their activities?
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Appendix E: Questions of Semi-structured interviews
Interview Instrument
Title of the research: Oversight of Recognized Organizations: Understanding Flag
States Practices
Purpose of the research: This research focuses on the oversight of RO performance
to help countries, international organizations, and ROs in their role of providing safety
in the shipping industry. It aims to propose best practices that can be used to oversee
RO in their capacities of fulfilling their responsibilities on behalf of flag States.
Further, this research explores how flag states can efficiently use their maritime
administration´s limited resources to properly supervise the services provided by their
ROs.
Your participation: You are invited to participate in this interview which aims to
identify best practices that can be shared with other flag States in the oversight of
Recognized Organizations. Your responses will be treated in the strictest confidence
and anonymized. Your participation is completely voluntary and without any payment.
You are welcome to withdraw from the research at any time, even after answering the
questions. Thank you for your participation.
Researcher:
Name:
Contact:
Interviewee:
Name:
Nationality:
Organization:
Occupation:
Contact:
Email:
Number of years in the maritime administration:
Number of years in the RO´s oversight department:
1) Flag States maritime administration
How do you evaluate the result of the survey?
2) Flag States personnel
How do you assess the views of the responders about the most
important requirements for the flag States personnel in charge of ROs
oversight?
3) Oversight Activities: Planning and Implementation
Are the results concurring with your experiences?
4) Oversight Activities: Evaluation and Improvement
What is your assessment of this survey result?
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5) Oversight programme: Global Disruption, combined Oversight
Programme and IQARB
How do you assess the views of the responders about the disruption
caused by the COVID-19, the relevance of combined oversight programme,
and the International Quality Assessment Review Body?
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Appendix F: Interviewee Details
In-depth interviews
Number of participants: 03 USCG personnel
INT 1: 12 years of services (mid-level management)
INT 2: 20 years of services (top level management)
INT 3: 25 years (top level management)

Semi-structured interviews
INT 4: 20 years of service (RO personnel from the top-level management)
INT 5: 22 years of service (flag State administration personnel from the top-level
management)
INT 6: 26 years of service (maritime consultancy agency personnel from the toplevel management)
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Appendix G: Survey questionnaire
Questionnaire Instrument
Title of the research: Oversight of Recognized Organizations: Understanding Flag
States Practices
Purpose of the research: This research focuses on the oversight of RO performance
to help countries and international organizations in their role of providing safety in the
shipping industry. It aims to propose best practices that can be used to oversee RO in
their capacities of fulfilling their responsibilities on behalf of flag States. Further, this
research explores how flag states can efficiently use their maritime administration´s
limited resources to properly supervise the services provided by their ROs.
Your participation: You are invited to participate in this interview which aims to
identify best practices that can be shared with other flag States in the oversight of
Recognized Organizations. Your answer will help identify how important are the
following aspect in the oversight process. Your responses will be treated in the strictest
confidence and anonymized. Your participation is completely voluntary and without
any payment. You are welcome to withdraw from the research at any time, even after
answering the questions. Thank you for your participation.
Researcher:
Name:
Contact:
Interviewee:
Name (Optional):
Nationality:
Organization:
Occupation:
Contact:
Email:
Number of years in the industry:
Number of years in the RO´s oversight department:
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1) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspect of the Flag
States maritime administration is important to oversee ROs

Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important

Not
important

Q 1.1 The structure of the
Maritime administration to ensure
the oversight of ROs (dedicated
service and personnel)
Q 1.2 What other aspects related to the organization and structure of the flag States
maritime administration do you think are important for effective oversight of ROs?
Can you list them from the most important to the less important?

2) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspect related to the
Flag States personnel in charge of oversight activities is important to
oversee ROs
Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important
Q 2.1 The Selection process of the
personnel
Q 2.2 The need for the Maritime
administration personnel to have a
technical understanding of the
ROs
Q 2.3 The need for the Maritime
administration personnel to have a
business understanding of the RO
Q 2.4 The need for specific
training
Q 2.5 The need for an ethical
training
Q 2.6 The number of personnel
dedicated to the oversight
activities
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Not
important

Q 2.7 Evaluation programme for
the personnel in charge of the
oversight programme
Q 2.8 Can you choose among the aspects provided from Q2.1 to Q2.7 the three most
important in your opinion?

Q 2.9 What other aspects related to the flag States personnel in charge of the
oversight of the RO do you think are important for an effective oversight? Can you
list them?

3) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspect related to the
oversight activities is important to oversee ROs
Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important

Not
important

Q 3.1 Audits of RO quality
management system
Q 3.2 Participating in RO
activities to certify ships for the
flag State fleet
Q 3.3 Additional inspections by
flag States personnel of ships
certified by ROs
Q 3.4 Developing and monitoring
RO´s key performance indicators
Q 3.5 Developing and
implementing an oversight
programme
Q 3.6 Can you choose among the aspects provided from Q3.1 to Q3.5 the three most
important in your opinion?
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Q 3.7 What other oversight activities do you think are important for effective
oversight of ROs by a Flag State? Can you list them?

4) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspect related to
oversight activities planning is important to oversee ROs
Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important

Not
important

Q 4.1 Defining audit criteria
Q 4.2 Establishing objectives of
oversight activities
Q 4.3 Defining clear
communication procedures with
RO
Q 4.4 Frequency of
communication and report
Q 4.5 Funding of the oversight
programme activities
Q 4.6 Involving RO in the
preparation of the activities
Q 4.7 Involving other
stakeholders in the preparation of
the oversight activities
Q 4.8 Can you choose among the aspects provided from Q4.1 to Q4.7 the three most
important in your opinion?

Q 4.9 What other aspects related to the planning of the oversight activities do you
think are important for effective oversight of ROs by a flag State? Can you list them?
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5) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspect related to
oversight activities implementation is important to oversee ROs
Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important

Not
important

Q 5.1 Implementing high-level
audits
Q 5.2 Composition of the
oversight
audit/inspections/surveys team
Q 5.3 Communication of the
objectives to the ROs before the
activities
Q 5.4 Keeping record of the
oversight activities
Q 5.5 Can you choose among the aspects provided from Q5.1 to Q2.4 the three most
important in your opinion?

Q 5.6 What other aspects related to the implementation of oversight activities do you
think are important for effective oversight of ROs by a flag State? Can you list them?
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6) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspect related to the
evaluation and improvement of oversight activities is important to
oversee ROs
Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important

Not
important

Q 6.1 Implementing external audit
or evaluation of the flag State
oversight system
Q 6.2 Establishing a complaint
and feedback procedure
Q 6.3 Use of software to analyse
previous oversight findings
Q 6.4 Procedure to deal with the
follow up about rectifications of
deficiencies revealed by the
oversight activities
Q 6.5 Approval process of the
final report
Q 6.6 Incorporation of the
conclusions of previous
monitoring activities into new
activities
Q 6.7 Can you choose among the aspects provided from Q6.1 to Q6.6 the three most
important in your opinion?

Q 6.8 What other aspects related to the evaluation and improvement of oversight
activities do you think are important for effective oversight of ROs by a flag State?
Can you list them?
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7) Please rate to what extent you think the following aspects are important
to oversee ROs
Extremely Very
Moderately Slightly
important important important
important
Q 7.1 Implementation of
combined oversight programs
with other countries
Q 7.2 Relevance of the
International Quality Assessment
Review Body (IQARB) system
Q 7.3 The impact of COVID 19
on the effectiveness
Q 7.4 What other aspects can you think of as important for effective oversight of
ROs by a flag State? Can you list them?
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Not
important

Appendix H: WMU Research Ethics Committee Approval
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Appendix I: Details about the Participants in the Survey
Total number of participants: 97
Valid answers: 84 from 15 countries
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Appendix J: Delegation Status of ROs authorized by the USCG

‘

Source: USCG (2021). Status of Classification Society Recognition, ACP Participation, and
Authorizations Delegated by the U.S. Coast Guard.
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CGCVC/CVC4/ClassSocietyAuths.pdf.
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Appendix K: Flow Diagram for Quality Case Applicability

Note: extracted from USCG. (2022). Request for Recognized Organization (RO) Internal Quality
Management System
(QMS) Review – “Quality Case.” https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG5PC/CG-CVC/CVC_MMS/CVC-WI005(3)%20Request%20for%20RO%20Internal%20QMS%20Review%20%20Quality%20Case.pdf.
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Appendix L: Main Changes in the USCG oversight framework after the
El Faro accident
Organizational
Structure
 Creation the Flag
State Control
Division (CVC-4)
 Creation of the
office of thirdparty organization
coordinators
 Updates or new
guidelines such as
the Navigation
and Vessel
Inspection
Circular (NVIC
N° 02-95) which
defines the role of
all stakeholders
of the oversight
framework

Personnel and
training
 Hire thirdparty
organization
coordinators
 Hire new
inspectors
 Update of
Marine
inspectors
training
 Advanced
Inspector
training
with focus
on audits
skills

Planification and
implementation
 Review of field
inspection
activities by the
CVC-4
 Organization of
Annual RO’s
summit
 Establishment of
Quality cases
 Establishment
Vertical contract
audits
 Request for
Quarterly reports
from ROs
 Organization of
annual
inspectors’
conferences
 Unique supplement
for all ROs

Evaluation and
Improvement
 Use of mobile
application to
access vessel
records in the
MISLE
 Creation of
Management
System
Oversight
Module in
MISLE
 Annual Flag
State Control
report
 Creation of the
Fleet risk index
 Development of
ROs KPI

Note: adapted from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM).
(2021). Strengthening U.S. Coast Guard Oversight and Support of Recognized Organizations: The
Case of the Alternative Compliance Program. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
https://doi.org/10.17226/26450.

109

